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MATERIALITY AND A THEORY OF LEGAL 
CIRCULARITY 
WENDY GERWICK COUTURE* 
 
This Article argues that the materiality doctrine, which lies at the heart 
of securities fraud, has the potential to operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
This Article labels this phenomenon “legal circularity.”  In order to place 
the potential legal circularity of materiality in context among the various 
other legal doctrines that share this potential, this Article proposes a two-
part Theory of Legal Circularity.  First, this Article proposes the following 
Legal Circularity Test to identify potentially circular doctrines:  A legal 
doctrine is potentially circular if:  (1) the legal doctrine incorporates the 
behavior or attitude of a population or person, either hypothetical or real; 
and (2) the subject population or person either would (if hypothetical) or 
does (if real) consider prior precedent interpreting the legal doctrine when 
choosing said behavior or when adopting said attitude.  Materiality, among 
other legal doctrines, arguably satisfies this test because:  (1) the 
materiality standard focuses on whether there is a substantial likelihood 
that a hypothetical “reasonable investor” would consider information 
important when making an investment decision, and (2) a reasonable 
investor would arguably consider prior materiality precedent when 
assessing whether information is important to his or her investment 
decision.  Second, this Article proposes a Framework to Assess Legal 
Circularity, with the goal of providing guidance about whether to embrace 
a doctrine’s potential legal circularity.  Under this framework, which draws 
from the rich scholarship on the related but distinct concepts of stare 
decisis, substantive law heuristics, and precedential herding, courts and 
scholars should weigh (1) the risk of a “wrong” rule; (2) the effects of 
greater predictability; and (3) the import of reconceiving the courts’ role.  
Finally, this Article applies this framework to materiality, concluding that 
courts and scholars should explicitly embrace the legal circularity of 
 
* Wendy Gerwick Couture is an Associate Professor at the University of Idaho College of 
Law, where she teaches securities regulation, white collar crime, and other business and 
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materiality, coupled with increased investor education about materiality 
and absent any clarifying guidance from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission about the scope of the doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Materiality lies at the heart of securities fraud, dividing 
misrepresentations that are potentially actionable from those that pose no 
risk of liability.  The materiality standard, which encompasses myriad 
policy trade-offs, is deceptively simple:  a misstatement or omission is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
have considered it important in making an investment decision.1  This 
standard has been the subject of a deep and rich body of scholarship, yet 
heretofore unrecognized by scholars is its potential to be “legally circular.”2 
In short, when deciding whether to grant a representation any weight 
when making an investment decision, a reasonable investor would arguably 
consider whether, under existing case law, the representation would be 
actionable as securities fraud if false.  A reasonable investor would rely 
only on potentially actionable representations.  Therefore, existing case law 
about materiality is part of a reasonable investor’s analysis.  As a 
consequence, a court’s holding that a certain type of representation is 
immaterial as a matter of law operates as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Even if 
the court’s holding were incorrect at the time of issuance, subsequent 
 
 1.  See infra Parts I.A & I.B (discussing “[t]he Role of Materiality in Securities Fraud” 
and the definition of materiality). 
 2.  This Article’s author has previously noted materiality’s potential legal circularity in 
passing.  See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 
31 (2009) [hereinafter Couture, Gray Area] (“In other words, it is assumed that ‘reasonable’ 
investors disregard some statements by corporate officers.  Of course, this assumption is 
self-perpetuating.  Presumably, one of the reasons that reasonable investors discount puffing 
statements is their understanding that these types of statements cannot support a securities 
fraud claim.”). 
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reasonable investors would not rely on that type of representation 
henceforth.  This Article labels this phenomenon “legal circularity.”3 
After demonstrating that materiality is potentially legally circular, this 
Article places this phenomenon in context by developing a two-part Theory 
of Legal Circularity.  Although several scholars have analyzed the potential 
legal circularity of other doctrines, including various constitutional 
doctrines, they have not approached legal circularity in a comprehensive 
fashion, and this Article’s Theory of Legal Circularity seeks to fill this gap. 
As the first step of the Theory of Legal Circularity, this Article 
proposes the following Legal Circularity Test to identify potentially 
circular doctrines: A legal doctrine is potentially circular if:  (1) the legal 
doctrine incorporates the behavior or attitude of a population or person, 
either hypothetical or real; and (2) the subject population or person either 
would (if hypothetical) or does (if real) consider prior precedent 
interpreting the legal doctrine when choosing said behavior or when 
adopting said attitude. Materiality and the other potentially circular legal 
doctrines that scholars have identified satisfy this test, and this test is useful 
to identify additional doctrines that are potentially legally circular.4 
Merely because a doctrine is potentially legally circular does not 
mean, of course, that courts and scholars should embrace that circularity.  
Therefore, as the second step of the Theory of Circularity, this Article 
provides guidance about how to analyze whether the potential legal 
circularity of a doctrine should be adopted by proposing a Framework to 
Assess Legal Circularity.  This framework draws from the rich scholarship 
analyzing the related but distinct concepts of stare decisis, substantive law 
heuristics, and precedential herding.  Under this proposed framework, 
courts and scholars should weigh (1) the risk of a “wrong” rule; (2) the 
effects of greater predictability; and (3) the import of reconceiving the 
courts’ role.  This framework is comprehensive and complex, yielding a 
different result depending on the legal doctrine at issue.5 
Finally, in order to demonstrate how the Framework to Assess Legal 
Circularity should be applied and to reach a recommendation about 
whether courts and scholars should embrace the potential legal circularity 
of materiality, this Article applies the framework to the doctrine of 
materiality.  This Article concludes that the risk of a “wrong” materiality 
rule is slight because materiality primarily operates as a coordination 
mechanism and because other actors would be empowered to correct 
 
 3.  See infra Part I.C (arguing that materiality is circular).  
 4.  See infra Part II.A (proposing a “Legal Circularity Test to identify legal doctrines 
that are potentially circular”). 
 5.  See infra Part II.B (proposing a framework to assist courts and scholars “determine 
whether to embrace a legal doctrine’s potential legal circularity”). 
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course if an intrinsically “wrong” standard were adopted; that, when legal 
circularity is coupled with increased investor education about materiality 
and applied explicitly, the potential positive effects of greater predictability 
would outweigh the potential negative effects; and that, absent forthcoming 
materiality guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), courts should embrace this reconceived role with respect to the 
materiality doctrine.6 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  In Part I, this Article demonstrates 
the potential legal circularity of materiality by situating the materiality 
doctrine within securities fraud, explaining the current conception of 
materiality, providing examples of how the materiality doctrine operates as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, identifying the two analytical steps underlying 
the potential legal circularity of materiality, and assessing the 
descriptiveness of the legal circularity of materiality.  In Part II, this Article 
sets forth the Theory of Legal Circularity by proposing a Legal Circularity 
Test to identify potentially circular legal doctrines; explaining that legal 
circularity does not suffer from circular reasoning; distinguishing legal 
circularity from the doctrines of stare decisis, substantive law heuristics, 
and precedential herding, while recognizing that legal circularity mimics 
these doctrines to some degree; and proposing a Framework to Assess 
Legal Circularity that draws from the rich scholarship on stare decisis, 
substantive law heuristics, and herding.  In Part III, this Article applies the 
proposed Framework to Assess Legal Circularity to the doctrine of 
materiality, concluding that courts should explicitly embrace the legal 
circularity of materiality, coupled with enhanced investor education about 
materiality and in the absence of SEC guidance on materiality.  Finally, this 
Article briefly concludes, urging courts and scholars to incorporate the 
legal circularity of materiality into their analyses and urging scholars from 
other disciplines to apply the Theory of Legal Circularity beyond the scope 
of securities regulation. 
I. THE POTENTIAL LEGAL CIRCULARITY OF MATERIALITY 
Materiality is the linchpin of securities fraud, separating 
misrepresentations that are potentially actionable from those that bear no 
risk of liability.  The materiality standard encompasses myriad policy trade-
offs into a unitary objective standard:  a misstatement or omission is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
 
 6.  See infra Part III (applying the “proposed Framework to Assess Legal Circularity 
to the doctrine of materiality, for purposes both of exemplifying how [the] framework 
should be applied and of assessing whether the potential legal circularity of materiality 
should be embraced”). 
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have considered it important in making an investment decision.7  This 
deceptively simple-sounding standard is the subject of a deep body of 
scholarship,8 yet heretofore unidentified by scholars is that the materiality 
doctrine has the potential to operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  In other 
words, under the parlance of this Article, the materiality doctrine is 
potentially legally circular.  This section examines the role of materiality 
within securities fraud jurisprudence; explains the definition of materiality 
as developed through case law; demonstrates why materiality is potentially 
legally circular; identifies the two analytical steps underlying the potential 
legal circularity of materiality; and assesses the descriptiveness of the legal 
circularity of materiality. 
A. The Role of Materiality in Securities Fraud 
The fundamental goal of securities regulation, of which securities 
fraud is an essential component, is the creation of honest markets via 
comprehensive and accurate disclosure.9  In short, securities regulation is 
premised on the philosophy that “[t]here cannot be honest markets without 
honest publicity.”10  This policy was a reaction to the stock market crash of 
1929, which Congress attributed to the lack of information available to 
allow investors to make sound investment decisions.11  By mandating 
 
       7.    Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see infra Part I.B for a discussion of this definition. 
     8.    See infra Part I.A-I.B. 
       9.     Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (citing prior Supreme Court 
precedent) (“This Court repeatedly has described the fundamental purpose of the [Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934] as implementing a philosophy of full disclosure.”) (internal citations 
omitted); id. at 234 (“Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, 
is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress.”); John H. Walsh, Can Regulation Protect 
“Suckers” and “Fools” From Themselves?  Reflections on the Rhetoric of Investors and 
Investor Protection Under the Federal Securities Laws, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 188, 218 (2008) 
(explaining how the floor debates over the 1933 and 1934 Acts tied the protection of 
reasonable investors with “public disclosure of accurate information about issuer 
companies”). 
 10.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (citing the legislative history) (“The 1934 Act was designed 
to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices.  Underlying the adoption of 
extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy:  ‘There cannot be honest 
markets without honest publicity.  Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place 
thrive upon mystery and secrecy.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 11.  Walsh, supra note 9, at 217-19 (“In short, those arguing this position [that 
regulation should protect the investor who will exercise “reasonable care” and utilize the 
information regulation would make available] said, regulation would help those who were 
able to help themselves.  In the unregulated market the solid little fellows’ efforts at 
investigation had been frustrated.  Only sales blurbs had been available.  Through 
regulation, disclosure would give these investors an opportunity to investigate their 
investments and exercise their judgment with reasonable care.”). 
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comprehensive and accurate disclosure, Congress hoped that investors 
would return to the markets.12  As explained by Richard C. Sauer, “[r]isk is 
inherent in all investment activity, but the higher the quality of information 
provided about available investment opportunities, the more often investors 
will put capital to its most productive and profitable uses.”13 
The companion goals of comprehensiveness and accuracy both center 
on the concept of “materiality.”14  With respect to comprehensiveness, 
materiality serves as the dividing line between information that is necessary 
to ensure that investors can make informed decisions and information that 
is so “trivial”15 or of such “dubious significance”16 that disclosure is 
unnecessary.17  As such, issuers’ mandatory disclosure obligations, both 
when issuing securities and when engaging in periodic reporting,18 are 
premised on whether the information is material.19  Additionally, 
prohibitions on the selective disclosure of information depend on whether 
the disclosed information is material.20 
 
 12.  Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of 
the Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 317 (2007). 
 13.  Id. (“The guiding purpose of the many and complex disclosure provisions of the 
federal securities laws is to promote ‘transparency’ in the financial markets.”). 
 14.  Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: 
A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2003) [hereinafter Heminway, Materiality 
Guidance] (explaining that “materiality is defined using the same, well-known legal 
standard for many different purposes under the federal securities laws”). 
 15.  Mills v. Elec. Auto-Life Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (discussing materiality in 
the context of § 14(a)) (“This requirement that the defect have a significant propensity to 
affect the voting process . . . adequately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action 
cannot be established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for 
which approval is sought, that correction of the defect or imposition of liability would not 
further the interests protected by § 14(a).”) (emphasis omitted). 
 16.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (citing prior Supreme Court 
precedent) (noting that “certain information concerning corporate developments could well 
be of ‘dubious significance’”). 
 17.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (stating that the role of the materiality standard is “to filter 
out essentially useless information that a reasonable investor would not consider 
significant”); Sauer, supra note 12, at 318 (“That all information is not created equal is 
recognized in the federal securities laws through the concept of ‘materiality.’”). 
 18.  E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2002) (stating that “[i]n addition to the information 
expressly required to be included in a statement or report, there shall be added such further 
material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they are made not misleading.”).  
 19.  Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. 
Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 670-71 (2004) (“Regulation S-K, 
which relates to the financial condition and results of operations pursuant to informational 
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
contains numerous provisions that touch upon ‘materiality.’”). 
 20.  17 C.F.R. § 243.100-103 (2002). 
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With respect to accuracy, materiality serves as the dividing line 
between misrepresentations that are actionable and those that are too 
unimportant to result in liability.  Liability for misrepresentations, 
including securities fraud liability under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act,21 is premised on the materiality of the information.22  Indeed, 
Professor Michael J. Kaufman has even argued that materiality provides the 
basis for all other elements of securities fraud.23 
The central role of materiality within securities fraud is not 
uncontroversial.  For example, Professor Geoffrey Rapp has argued that, 
because retail investors rarely decide to buy or sell specific stocks, instead 
investing in diversified portfolios, firm-specific information is of little 
import to ordinary retail investors.24  Rather, “[a]ll that should matter to an 
average, ordinary investor is the relationship between a particular stock and 
the investor’s broader investment portfolio.”25  Therefore, Professor Rapp 
argues that the materiality element should be “dropped for any claims 
involving fraud against ordinary investors.”26  Despite critiques of 
materiality’s central role within securities fraud, this element remains 
pivotal under current doctrine.  Indeed, one recent study found that 13% of 
securities fraud complaints were dismissed, at least in part, on the ground 
that an alleged misrepresentation was immaterial as a matter of law.27 
Even within securities fraud jurisprudence, materiality serves several 
different roles.  When securities fraud liability is premised on an alleged 
 
 21.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). 
 22.  E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2) (imposing liability for material 
misrepresentations in registration statements and prospectuses); see Lee, supra note 19, at 
661 (“‘Materiality’ is an essential element to establish liability under U.S. Federal securities 
laws.  These laws include the anti-fraud and proxy solicitation laws and Regulation FD.”). 
 23.  Michael J. Kaufman, Living in a Material World:  Strict Liability Under Rule 10B-
5, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 33-75 (1990). 
 24.  Geoffrey Rapp, Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation:  Amgen’s Missed 
Opportunity, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1475, 1481-82 (2013). 
 25.  Id. at 1482 (emphasis omitted). 
 26.  Id. at 1483. 
 27.  Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities 
Class Actions:  An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 850, 862 tbl.3 
(2012).  This percentage reflects the sum of the following two columns in Table 3 of Choi 
and Pritchard’s study:  “Both denied and granted dismissal based on the ground” and 
“Dismissal granted (at least partially) based on the ground.”  Id.  Therefore, this percentage 
includes some motions to dismiss that were denied in part on this basis, as long as the 
motions to dismiss were also granted in part on this basis.  See also Wendy Gerwick 
Couture, Around the World of Securities Fraud in 80 Motions to Dismiss, 45 LOY. UNIV. 
CHI. L.J. 553, 559 (2014) (analyzing 80 opinions on motions to dismiss securities fraud class 
actions that were issued in 2013) (finding that in 19% of the opinions courts granted 
dismissal, at least in part, on the basis that a representation was immaterial as a matter of 
law). 
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misstatement, liability depends on the statement’s materiality.28  When 
securities fraud liability is premised on an alleged omission, liability 
depends on the materiality of the undisclosed information.29  Finally, as a 
subset of omission liability, the obligation to disclose inside information or 
abstain from insider trading is triggered only when the information is 
material.30 
The policy trade-offs encompassed within the concept of materiality 
depend on whether materiality is being used to define the scope of liability 
for an alleged misstatement or for an alleged omission.  In the context of 
alleged misstatements, if the materiality bar is set too low, the potential for 
liability will chill voluntary disclosure, thus contravening the goal of full 
disclosure.31  If the materiality bar is set too high, however, the potential for 
 
 28.  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156-57 
(2008). 
 29.  Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the 
Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 327 (2009) 
[hereinafter Heminway, Female Investors] (“Conceptions of the reasonable investor and of 
materiality are rooted in disclosure.  As noted earlier, assuming the existence of a duty to 
disclose, materiality sorts out that which must be disclosed from that which need not be 
disclosed; the sorting mechanism relies on a determination of the importance of the relevant 
facts to the reasonable investor or the reasonable investor’s view on the significance of the 
relevant facts to the total mix of available information.”). 
 30.  Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It!  Specific Rulemaking on Materiality 
Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1006-07 (2012) [hereinafter Heminway, 
Just Do It!] (“The judge-made ‘disclose or abstain’ rule is the substantive focal point of U.S. 
insider trading regulation under Rule 10b-5 . . . .  The ‘disclose or abstain’ rule provides that 
when an issuer of publicly traded securities or one of its insiders is in possession of 
undisclosed material information, the issuer or insider must either disclose the material 
information before trading in the issuer’s securities or abstain from trading in the issuer’s 
securities.  Most insider trading claims are raised under Rule 10b-5 and involve the 
application and interpretation of this rule.  Although the materiality of undisclosed 
information is quite clear in some cases; in others, materiality is contestable and may be 
determinative.”). 
 31.  Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the 
Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 
122-23 (2005) (“By offering protection from liability, the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine 
provides another incentive for issuers and others to make soft information available to 
investors.  The same incentive effect applies to statutory safe harbors that codify the 
‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine.”); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics 
and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (2003) [hereinafter Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral 
Economics] (“Stringent antifraud provisions (and accompanying private and public 
enforcement) help ensure that the disclosures made to investors are truthful and accurate.  
Even if investors cannot process information rationally, the threat of private litigation and 
public enforcement may deter fraud and opportunistic behavior.  As with disclosure, 
materiality forms a key component of antifraud liability . . . .  Expanding the materiality 
concept may also lead to more frivolous lawsuits, thereby impairing the value of antifraud 
liability as a deterrent against fraud.  Firms may also reduce their disclosures in an effort to 
avoid their exposure to fraud suits.  Both frivolous suits and reduced disclosure will raise the 
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liability will not deter inaccurate disclosure, contravening the goal of 
accuracy.32  In the context of alleged omissions, if the materiality bar is set 
too low, companies will be compelled to disclose even trivial information, 
thus potentially overshadowing the important information and undercutting 
the goal of comprehensive disclosure.33  If the materiality bar is set too 
high, however, companies can hide key information from investors without 
recourse, likewise contravening the goal of full disclosure.  In the context 
of insider trading, if the materiality bar is set too low, it “may inhibit 
legitimate uses of information, such as engaging in securities analysis or 
leading a company into value-enhancing transactions.”34  If the materiality 
bar is set too high, however, insiders can profit from inside information.35 
Despite the myriad policy trade-offs encompassed within materiality 
in different contexts, the Supreme Court applies a unitary materiality 
standard.36  As a consequence, materiality occupies an uneasy role within 
 
cost of capital, once again resulting in fewer investment opportunities for investors.”); R. 
Gregory Roussel, Note, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery:  Refinement of the Corporate 
Puffery Defense, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1085 (1998) (“The Corporate Puffery Defense 
permits entrepreneurs to discuss their opinions openly with the possessors of capital.  The 
drafters of the Reform Act specifically designed the safe harbor to encourage corporate 
officers to provide the market with forward-looking information.”); see also Wendy 
Gerwick Couture, Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor’s Rocky Shore, 39 SEC. REG. L.J. 
257, 258 (2011) [hereinafter Couture, Mixed Statements] (discussing how the statutory safe 
harbor for forward-looking statements was meant to achieve a similar goal of preventing 
companies from “refraining from voluntarily disclosing predictive information for fear of 
future liability if the prediction does not come to fruition”). 
 32.  David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1398 
(2006) [hereinafter Hoffman, The Best Puffery] (recognizing that the puffery doctrine is an 
attempt, albeit unsuccessful in his opinion, to “walk[] the line between overdeterrence of 
speech and underdeterrence of fraud”); Kaufman, supra note 23, at 3-4 (noting that the 
definition of materiality strikes a balance “between the remedial objectives of the securities 
laws and the dangers of over-deterrence of salutary business practices”). 
 33.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (“[T]he Court was careful not to 
set too low a standard of materiality; it was concerned that a minimal standard might bring 
an overabundance of information within its reach”); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 
U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (“[T]he disclosure policy embodied in the proxy regulations is not 
without limit.  Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its 
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good . . . .  [I]f the standard of materiality is 
unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and its management be subjected to 
liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements, but also management’s fear of 
exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an 
avalanche of trivial information[,] a result that is hardly conducive to informed 
decisionmaking.”). 
 34.  Wendy Gerwick Couture, Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower Materiality 
Standard, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 77, 78-80, 85 (2013) (hereinafter Couture, Criminal Securities 
Fraud). 
 35.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1191. 
 36.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 n.18 (“Devising two different standards of materiality, one 
for situations where insiders have traded in abrogation of their duty to disclose or abstain (or 
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securities fraud jurisprudence.37  As a number of scholars have recognized, 
adjusting the standard to better serve the policies underlying one type of 
securities fraud risks upending the policies underlying another type of 
securities fraud.38  For example, Professors Stephen J. Choi and A.C. 
Pritchard have recognized that lowering the materiality standard as applied 
to misrepresentations could solve the problem of investors being misled by 
over-optimism, while simultaneously creating the problem of inundating 
investors with too much disclosure.39  Conversely, Professor Stefan J. 
Padfield has argued that “excessive characterization of disclosures as 
immaterial creates conflicts with [the] disclosure regime.”40 
 
for that matter when any disclosure duty has been breached), and another covering 
affirmative misrepresentations by those under no duty to disclose (but under the ever-
present duty not to mislead), would effectively collapse the materiality requirement into the 
analysis of defendant’s disclosure duties.”). 
 37.  Lee, supra note 19, at 674 (“In the disclosure context, the disclosure forms and 
statements have been used for the application for the application . . . of the materiality test.  
In the insider-trading context, materiality acts as a barrier against insiders profiting from 
inside information.  Here, the disclosure context begs the question, ‘Is something material in 
relation to the information that the SEC requires, or [in] the statement that is being made, 
that must be included in order to keep the answer or the statement from being misleading?’  
Now compare this to the insider-information context, which revolves around the query, 
‘When has enough information been disclosed so that insiders are free to trade?’”). 
 38.  Sauer, supra note 12, at 356-57 (“The conditioning of issuer disclosure obligations 
upon a materiality requirement is a critical component of the regulation of the capital 
markets. . . .  The erosion of this standard to achieve such governmental objectives as a 
more favorable playing field in litigation should be carefully scrutinized by the courts and 
held in check to protect the overarching principles of our system of financial regulation.”). 
 39.  Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 61 (recognizing tension 
between the standard that should apply for purposes of disclosure and the standard that 
should apply for purposes of fraud liability:  “If investors are easily led astray by 
overoptimism, then perhaps a broader definition of materiality is required.  For example, the 
definition might be expanded to include ‘puffery’ that could trigger overoptimism.  On the 
other hand, bounded rationality implies that investors will have limited attention spans—
requiring more disclosure may cause them to ignore more important information.  Indeed, 
armed with an overconfident sense of his ability to digest mountains of disclosure, an 
investor may miss important aspects of disclosure.  Bounded rationality may therefore lead 
one to recommend a narrower concept of materiality for securities disclosure to reduce the 
amount of information given to investors.”). 
 40.  Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies:  Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities 
Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 178 (2010) [hereinafter Padfield, Immaterial 
Lies]; see id. at 179-80 (“To the extent that courts routinely find disclosure immaterial on 
the basis of safety-valve doctrines that twist the definition of materiality to the breaking 
point, they weaken the effectiveness of these rules by creating unnecessary confusion about 
the definition of materiality.  By relying more on grounds other than materiality to dismiss 
securities claims, the courts can continue to release the pressure created by frivolous suits 
while at the same time arguably allowing the definition of materiality for purposes of up-
front disclosure decisions to suffer less distortion.”). 
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In light of the myriad policy trade-offs encompassed within 
materiality, it is debatable whether materiality should be defined identically 
in the contexts of misstatements and omissions.41  Indeed, some scholars 
have even gone so far as to argue that, within each type of securities fraud, 
the standard of materiality should be adjusted depending on the identity of 
the speaker, the type of information, or the identity of the investor.42  This 
Article, while encouraging further scholarship on whether materiality 
should be a unitary standard, assumes a uniform definition of materiality, 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
B. The Definition of Materiality 
The Supreme Court defines materiality with a deceptively simple 
test:43 a misstatement or omission is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would have considered it important in 
making an investment decision.44  In another articulation, a misstatement or 
omission is material if it “would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”45 
 
 41.  Lee, supra note 19, at 674 (“It is therefore highly plausible that materiality 
determinations are context-sensitive.  Furthermore, it is possible that the SEC and the courts 
may apply ‘materiality’ standards differently in different contexts, while paying lip service 
to a common standard and utilizing the flexible TSC standard.  However, the suggestion to 
redefine materiality for each context has been rejected by the SEC.”). 
 42.  James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 
513, 519 (2009) (arguing that within the context of financial misstatements only, companies 
should only be vicariously liable for quantitatively large misstatements, while individuals’ 
liability should continue to be assessed using a qualitative materiality standard); Margaret 
V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change:  The Case for Replacing “The Reasonable 
Investor” With “The Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 
473, 481 (2006) (“This Article proposes a solution for courts facing the apparent conflict 
between fairness to underclass investors and loyalty to Northway/Basic:  an alternative 
materiality standard for inefficient markets.  The alternative standard replaces ‘the 
reasonable investor’ with ‘the least sophisticated investor,’ a fictitious person modeled after 
the ‘the least sophisticated consumer’ from federal consumer law.”). 
 43.  Donald C. Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create “Good” Securities Fraud 
Doctrine?, 51 EMORY L.J. 309, 317 (2002) [hereinafter Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated] 
(“This simple-sounding articulation tempts judges to treat the question as easier than it 
really is and proceed with excessive confidence toward an answer.”). 
 44.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“We now expressly adopt the 
TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”); TSC 
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“An omitted fact is material if 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 
deciding how to vote.”). 
 45.  TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 (“Put another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
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This materiality test, which centers on the importance of the 
misrepresentation to a hypothetical reasonable investor rather than to the 
plaintiff investor, is an objective standard.46  As a consequence, courts can 
dismiss securities fraud claims if, as a matter of law, no reasonable investor 
would have considered the misrepresentation to be important when making 
an investment decision.47  Indeed, as discussed above, courts frequently do 
just that.48 
This hypothetical reasonable investor is intelligent and informed, 
rather than attributed with “a child-like simplicity.”49  John H. Walsh 
performed an extensive study of the floor debates about the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and found that, although 
there were competing characterizations of investors as “suckers and fools” 
and as “gullible lambs,” the “rhetoric of intelligent and trusting investors 
carried the day.”50 
The materiality test is contextual and fact-specific.51  Courts and 
scholars have identified myriad elements to be considered during the 
 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”). 
 46.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 (“As we clarify today, materiality depends on the 
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented 
information.”); TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 445 (analyzing materiality in the context of § 14(a)) 
(“The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, involving the 
significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.”). 
 47.  Wendy Gerwick Couture, Opinions Actionable As Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 
381, 416 (2013) [hereinafter Couture, Opinions Actionable] (“Although the materiality 
element is a question of fact, courts routinely dismiss statements of opinion because they are 
immaterial as a matter of law, often characterizing these statements as ‘mere puffery.’”). 
 48.  See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 27, at 862 (explaining that 13% of securities 
fraud complaints were dismissed, on the ground that an alleged misrepresentation was 
immaterial as a matter of law).  
 49.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (citing lower court precedent) (explaining that the 
materiality standard does not “attribute to investors a child-like simplicity”). 
 50.  Walsh, supra note 9, at 190; id. at 227 (“At the end of the debates, the 
characterization of investors advanced by those who supported the investor protection 
regime embodied in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act stands out as distinct.  They 
alone described investors as intelligent and trusting in the nation’s financial institutions, and 
yes, susceptible to mob psychology, but that was a susceptibility from which they could be 
protected.  In the 1930s this was the rhetoric that carried the day.”). 
 51.  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011) (explaining 
that, when assessing the materiality of adverse event reports, “statistical significance (or the 
lack thereof) . . . is not dispositive of every case”); Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (describing the 
materiality analysis as “inherently fact-specific”); TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450 (“The 
determination requires delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ 
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him, and 
these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact.”); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 
No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150, 45151 (Aug. 12, 1999) (“The Board’s present position is that 
no general standards of materiality could be formulated to take into account all the 
considerations that enter into an experienced human judgment.”); Park, supra note 42, at 
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materiality analysis, but they boil down to two factors:  (1) the substance of 
the misstated or omitted information; and (2) the reliability of that 
substance. 
The first factor examines whether a reasonable investor would actually 
care about the substance of the misrepresentation.  For example, a 
reasonable investor would probably care if a company that he or she was 
considering investing in lost a major contract or failed to obtain Food and 
Drug Administration approval of a new product.52  On the other hand, a 
reasonable investor would probably not care about the misspelling of a 
board member’s last name or the overstatement of profits by one dollar.  In 
a closer case, the Fourth Circuit held that a CEO’s statement that he had 
earned a bachelor’s degree from Syracuse University, when he had actually 
completed only three years of study, was immaterial as a matter of law.53 
The second factor examines whether the misrepresentation was 
presented in such a way that a reasonable investor would have considered it 
reliable enough to factor into an investment decision.  This factor 
encompasses a variety of considerations.  For one, the identity of the 
speaker is relevant to the statement’s reliability and thus its materiality.  A 
statement by a company through its officers and directors is more reliable 
than a statement by a mere company spokesperson,54 by an analyst,55 or by 
 
528 (“SAB No. 99 significantly increases the cost of defending private suits based on 
financial misstatements by making it clear that materiality will depend on an intensive 
factual inquiry.”); Sauer, supra note 12, at 321 (“Various factors conjoin to confuse this 
process.  Determining which facts if added, singly or in combination, to the “total mix” of 
available information would have been important to investors in a specific stock on a 
particular day is a highly circumstantial inquiry.”). 
 52.  See Thomas Lee Hazen, LAW OF SEC. REG. § 12.9 (4th ed. 2002) (listing examples 
of information that is probably material). 
 53.  Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 661 (4th Cir. 2004) (“We hold 
that, viewed properly, it is not substantially likely that reasonable investors would devalue 
the stock knowing that Mitchell skipped out on his last year at Syracuse.  That is, if one 
imagines a parallel universe of affairs where the one and only thing different was the 
MCG’s filings made no mention of Mitchell’s education (or, instead, said simply that he 
‘attended’ Syracuse or ‘studied economics’ there), we find it incredible to believe that 
MCG’s stock would be worth even a penny more to a reasonable investor.”). 
 54.  Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo:  The Unfortunate Re-Emergence of 
the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1739-40 
(1998) (“The courts should also consider the identity of the speaker.  Investors would most 
likely attach greater significance to statements made by a company’s officer or director than 
to statements made by other representatives of the company, such as spokespersons, or to 
statements made indirectly by the company through analysts.”). 
 55.  Id. at 1731 (“Because there is a danger that an analyst may have misheard or 
misunderstood the company’s statement, or that the analyst may have failed to communicate 
the statement properly, a statement reported by an analyst may be less reliable than a 
statement made directly by the company.”). 
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a broker.56  A statement by an established analyst, however, is more 
reliable than an anonymous commenter on the Internet.57  Additionally, 
whether the statement is characterizing present facts or predicting the 
future affects its materiality because “[i]nvestors understand that forward-
looking statements are inherently unreliable.”58  Further, the mode of 
communication is relevant to a statement’s reliability and thus its 
materiality.  For example, a statement in an SEC filing is more reliable than 
an off-the-cuff oral statement,59 and an analyst report is more reliable than 
an internet posting.60  Finally, the setting of the statement affects its 
reliability.  For instance, if a statement were to be made in a promotional 
setting, “investors would be more likely to understand that the company’s 
statement may be somewhat exaggerated and may therefore place less 
importance on it.”61 
In sum, the materiality standard is an objective inquiry into whether 
there is a significant likelihood that a reasonable investor would have 
considered the alleged misstatement or omission important when making 
an investment decision, taking into account both the substance of the 
alleged misrepresentation and indicia of its reliability. 
C. Materiality’s Potential Legal Circularity 
This section identifies an aspect of the materiality analysis that has not 
been examined by other scholars.  Materiality is arguably circular because 
earlier courts’ rulings on materiality affect the future behavior of 
reasonable investors, which in turn affects future courts’ rulings on 
materiality.  Therefore, earlier courts’ materiality rulings have the potential 
 
 56.  Id. at 1730-31 (“Certainly, a reasonable investor would place greater significance 
on a statement made by a company than on a statement made by a broker.  The investor is 
well aware that the company, through it officers and directors, owes fiduciary duties to its 
investors.  On the other hand, a reasonable investor might be more likely to discount a 
statement made by a broker, who is trying to make a sale.”).  
 57.  Sauer, supra note 12, at 322 (“The source and presentation of information may also 
influence its perceived reliability to investors.  A report from an established analyst typically 
carries more weight with investors than a pseudonymous posting on an Internet thread.  
Thus, even intentionally false statements about a company by an individual with no ability 
to influence investment decisions may be deemed immaterial.”). 
 58.  O’Hare, supra note 54, at 1733. 
 59.  O’Hare, supra note 52, at 1738 (“An important factor to consider is where the 
statement was made.  If the statement was made in a document filed with the SEC, a 
reasonable investor might find a vague statement to be significant, despite its vagueness.  
On the other hand, if the statement was made orally, in a casual setting, a reasonable 
investor would probably not attach much significance to a vague statement of corporate 
optimism.”). 
 60.  Sauer, supra note 12, at 322. 
 61.  O’Hare, supra note 54, at 1738. 
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to operate as self-fulfilling prophecies.  As this section posits, the potential 
legal circularity of materiality affects both the substance and reliability 
factors of the materiality analysis.  This section further demonstrates how 
legal circularity arguably operates within the materiality doctrines of 
puffery, bespeaks caution, and trivial matters.  Additionally, this section 
identifies the two analytical steps that underlie the legal circularity of 
materiality and cites authority in support of the existence of each step.  
Finally, this section examines the descriptiveness of the legal circularity of 
materiality, concluding that the evidence is mixed about whether courts are 
currently treating materiality as legally circular. 
1. An Overview of the Potential Legal Circularity of 
Materiality 
The doctrine of materiality is arguably circular.  Whether a reasonable 
investor would consider a statement or omission to be important when 
making an investment decision is arguably informed by whether prior 
courts have found statements or omissions of the same ilk to be material.  If 
prior courts have found that certain statements or omissions are immaterial 
as a matter of law, a reasonable investor would arguably not consider 
similar statements or omissions to be important when making an 
investment decision because there is no legal incentive for the speaker to be 
accurate.  If prior courts have found that certain statements or omissions are 
potentially material, on the other hand, a reasonable investor would 
arguably give similar statements or omissions greater weight because the 
speaker bears the risk of liability for misrepresentations.  Therefore, when a 
court rules that an alleged misrepresentation is immaterial as a matter of 
law or that it is potentially material, this ruling is a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
A simple example demonstrates the potential circularity of materiality.  
In isolation, it is debatable whether an investor would consider an 
executive’s statement that “X is a good asset” to be important when making 
an investment decision.  Once a court has decreed that this type of 
statement is immaterial as a matter of law, however, subsequent reasonable 
investors would understand that this statement is not actionable and can be 
made without recourse.  As such, subsequent reasonable investors would 
not consider the statement that “X is a good asset” to be important when 
making their investment decisions.  The court’s earlier pronouncement of 
the statement’s immateriality, regardless of whether the pronouncement 
was well-founded at the time that it was made, is thus a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Professors Choi and Pritchard have similarly recognized that 
materiality has the potential to operate circularly: 
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Market participants also will adjust their behavior to take into 
account new judge-made securities law.  Consider a judicial 
opinion that defines materiality to reflect the disclosure needs of 
behaviorally challenged investors.  Investors, once aware of this 
change, may be less skeptical in interpreting information (given 
the added protection of antifraud liability), which may then leave 
them more exposed to fraud.  Subsequent judges may then find 
even prior, ill-advised changes to the definition of materiality 
now justified given the reduced vigilance of investors.62 
 
Professors Choi and Pritchard have indeed identified one example of 
potential legal circularity, but this Article argues that this potential 
permeates numerous facets of the materiality analysis. 
The potential legal circularity of materiality affects both factors of the 
materiality analysis.  In some contexts, legal circularity affects whether a 
reasonable investor would consider the substance of the alleged statement 
or omission to be important.  More often, legal circularity affects whether a 
reasonable investor would consider an alleged statement or omission 
sufficiently reliable to be important.  In order to demonstrate the potential 
impact of legal circularity on these two factors of the materiality analysis, 
this Article will explain how legal circularity arguably operates within the 
materiality doctrines of puffery, bespeaks caution, and trivial matters. 
a. The Potential Legal Circularity of the Puffery Doctrine 
Under the puffery doctrine, generalized statements of optimism are 
deemed immaterial as a matter of law.63  In the classic articulation, 
“[v]ague, optimistic statements are not actionable because reasonable 
investors do not rely on them in making investment decisions.”64  This 
doctrine affects both the substance of the alleged misrepresentation and its 
reliability, and each aspect is arguably legally circular. 
 
 62.  Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 50. 
 63.  Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Statements 
classified as ‘corporate optimism’ or ‘mere puffing’ are typically forward-looking 
statements, or are generalized statements of optimism that are not capable of objective 
verification.”); Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 302 (“Under the ‘mere 
puffery’ defense, a person against whom a securities fraud action has been brought argues 
that alleged misrepresented facts are not materially inaccurate or incomplete because those 
alleged facts constitute nothing more than nonspecific, positive representations.”). 
 64.  Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1119. 
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First, the puffery doctrine affects the substance of statements because 
it purports to “decode”65 a company’s statements, explaining what the 
company is actually implying (and not implying) with its generalized 
statements of optimism.66  For example, in Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., a 
company stated that the planned auction of the company was “going well” 
and “going smoothly.”67  The Seventh Circuit, applying the puffery 
doctrine, stated that no reasonable investor would have interpreted these 
statements to mean something positive because “[e]verybody knows that 
someone trying to sell something is going to look and talk on the bright 
side.”68  As Judge Posner explained: 
 
An utterly candid statement of the company’s hopes and fears, 
with emphasis on the fears, might well have pushed the 
company’s stock below $40, but perhaps only because, given the 
expectation of puffing, such a statement would be taken to 
indicate that the prospects for the auction were much grimmer 
than they were.  Where puffing is the order of the day, literal 
truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and recipients of 
letters of recommendation well know.  Mere sales puffery is not 
actionable under Rule 10b-5.69 
 
The puffery doctrine’s effect on the substance of a statement is 
arguably circular.  As Professor Donald C. Langevoort has explained, at the 
 
 65.  Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths:  Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors 
and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 107 (1999) [hereinafter Langevoort, Half-Truths] (“Judge 
Richard Posner made the plausible observation that corporate rhetoric has gradually evolved 
to a point where it has become the norm to use language that overstates corporate prospects.  
Listeners thus gradually learn the code.  Once this happens, then all companies are 
effectively forced to conform.  If a company does not use the overly optimistic rhetoric but 
instead tells the truth, the market will nonetheless assume that the disclosure is still in code 
and hence things must be that much worse.”). 
 66.  Couture, Opinions Actionable, supra note 47, at 430 (“This Article proposes that 
courts apply the following reasonable implication test to distinguish potentially material 
opinions from those that are immaterial as a matter of law:  Does the opinion reasonably 
imply an allegedly false, material fact?”); Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 65, at 113 
(arguing that the first step in order to impose liability for a half-truth is to analyze “if it is 
spoken or written in such a way that, in context, even a reasonably savvy investor would 
draw a natural—but materially mistaken—inference from it.”). 
 67.  Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 68.  Id. at 745 (“We doubt that nonspecific representations that an auction process is 
going well or going smoothly could, in the circumstances of this case . . . influence a 
reasonable investor to pay more for a stock than he otherwise would.  Everybody knows that 
someone trying to sell something is going to look and talk on the bright side.  You don’t sell 
a product by bad mouthing it.”) (emphasis in original). 
 69.  Id. at 746. 
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time that the Seventh Circuit made this pronouncement, it was debatable 
whether “everybody” would have interpreted these statements to mean that 
the auction was proceeding disappointingly.70  Henceforth, however, in 
light of the Seventh Circuit’s pronouncement, reasonable investors would 
arguably understand this code.  Therefore, even if the Seventh Circuit was 
off-base in its original ruling (as it may well have been), subsequent 
reasonable investors would not consider these statements to be important, 
rendering these statements immaterial as a matter of law.  Therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit’s ruling operates as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Second, the puffery doctrine affects the reliability of statements 
because it depends on the premise that generalized statements of optimism 
are mere “positive spin” and thus inherently unreliable.71  For example, in 
Grossman v. Novell, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that a company’s 
statements that it had “experienced ‘substantial success’ in integrating the 
sales forces of the two companies, that the merger was moving ‘faster than 
we thought,’ and that the merger presented a ‘compelling set of 
opportunities’ for the company” were immaterial as a matter of law 
because they were “the sort of soft, puffing statements, incapable of 
objective verification, that courts routinely dismiss as vague statements of 
corporate optimism.”72  As explained by Professor Langevoort, “[t]he 
standard line here is that savvy investors know enough to recognize the 
habitual propensity of managers to put a positive spin on the company’s 
prospects, and thus ignore it.”73 
The puffery doctrine’s effect on the reliability of statements is also 
arguably circular.  As various scholars have noted, including Professor 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Professor G. Mitu Gulati, Professor Langevoort, 
and Professor Padfield, it is indeed questionable whether, in isolation, a 
reasonable investor would ignore puffing statements as inherently 
unreliable.74  Once courts have so decreed, however, reasonable investors 
 
 70.  Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated, supra note 43, at 310-11 (“Judge Posner said 
that a reasonable investor would understand that ‘smoothly’ coheres with ‘disappointingly,’ 
if not ‘disastrously.’  While this conclusion may be right (I am not sure by any means), it is 
rather stunning for Judge Posner to conclude that this inference is so clear that no reasonable 
juror could possibly think otherwise, the standard test for dismissal as a matter of law.”); 
Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 65, at 123 (“What I am bothered by is his conclusion 
that it is essentially beyond doubt that the informed investment community would treat 
Centel’s ‘smoothly’ statement to indicate nothing more than that officials were not certain 
that there would be an auction failure.  That is possible, but not empirically self-evident.”). 
 71.  Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 746 (“Centel put a rosy face on an inherently uncertain 
process; investors would have expected no less . . . .”).  
 72.  Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 73.  Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 65, at 121. 
 74.  Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material To Investors?  Maybe We Should Ask Them, 
10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339, 340-41 (2008) [hereinafter Padfield, Is Puffery Material?] 
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would arguably learn that these statements are not actionable and thus 
disregard them henceforth.  In short, the pronouncement that generalized 
statements of optimism are immaterial as a matter of law is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
b. The Potential Legal Circularity of the Bespeaks Caution 
Doctrine 
Under the bespeaks caution doctrine, a forward-looking statement is 
rendered immaterial as a matter of law if it is accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary statements.75  As explained by the Tenth Circuit, “[f]orward-
looking representations are also considered immaterial when the defendant 
has provided the investing public with sufficiently specific risk disclosures 
or other cautionary statements concerning the subject matter of the 
statements at issue to nullify any potentially misleading effect.”76  This 
 
(“This Article seeks to fill some of the void of empirical research in this area by reporting 
the results of an investor survey (the ‘Puffery Survey’), focusing on materiality 
determinations in the puffery context, and comparing these responses to judicial predictions 
that no reasonable investor could find the surveyed statements material.  What the survey 
results show is that while the judges in the four surveyed cases concluded that no reasonable 
investor could find the statements challenged therein to be material because they constituted 
non-actionable puffery, between 33% and 84% of reasonable investors surveyed deemed the 
statements material.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges 
Maximize?  (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly):  Rules of Thumb in 
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 119-20 (2002) (“Anecdotally, it does not take 
much time watching investment programs on television to notice that even quite vague 
statements of optimism by corporate managers are considered important by the investment 
news media.”); Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 65, at 122 (“To say that smart investors 
simply assume that optimism is a façade and discount it is no more obvious than saying that 
smart investors never rely on brokers’ recommendations because of the their temptations to 
promote purchases and sales.”). 
 75.  Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1120 (“Forward-looking representations are also considered 
immaterial when the defendant has provided the investing public with sufficiently specific 
risk disclosures or other cautionary statements concerning the subject matter of the 
statements at issue to nullify any potentially misleading effect.”); In re Donald J. Trump 
Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e can state as a 
general matter that, when an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections are 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not 
form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the ‘total mix’ of 
information the document provided investors.  In other words, cautionary language, if 
sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of 
law.”); Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 304 (“A defendant in a securities 
fraud action who asserts the ‘bespeaks caution’ defense argues that a particular 
misrepresented or omitted forward-looking statement of fact is immaterial as a matter of law 
because tailored cautionary statements have adequately qualified it.”). 
 76.  Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1120. 
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doctrine affects the reliability of an alleged misrepresentation, and this 
effect is arguably legally circular. 
The bespeaks caution doctrine states that forward-looking statements 
that are accompanied by sufficient cautionary language are inherently 
unreliable.  For example, in In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj 
Mahal Litigation, the Third Circuit held that the statement “‘[t]he 
Partnership believes that funds . . . will be sufficient to cover all of its debt 
service (interest and principal)’” was immaterial as a matter of law.77  The 
court explained:  
 
[W]e believe that due to the disclaimers and warnings the 
prospectus contains, no reasonable investor could believe 
anything but that the Taj Mahal bonds represented a rather risky, 
speculative investment which might yield a high rate of return, 
but which alternatively might result in no return or even a loss.78 
 
The bespeaks caution doctrine’s effect on the reliability of a forward-
looking statement is arguably legally circular.  As Professors Bainbridge 
and Gulati have aptly pointed out, the premise of the bespeaks caution 
doctrine is shaky: 
 
The court, therefore, is not merely saying it is likely that investors 
read the offending statement in context.  Instead, it is saying that 
there can be no disagreement, at least among reasonable people, 
that the cautionary statement negated the market impact of the 
CEO’s optimistic statement.  Maybe, but how do the judges know 
this with such certainty?  Even if it could be shown that 
cautionary statements always temper CEO bombast, moreover, 
such a showing could only be made on the basis of extensive and 
highly sophisticated information about how investors evaluate 
information and how they discount statements.  As with puffery, 
however, judicial invocations of the bespeaks caution doctrine are 
almost never supported by any research evidence on the behavior 
of investors or markets.79 
 
 
 77.  In re Donald J. Trump Casino, 7 F.3d at 369 (“We believe that given this extensive 
yet specific cautionary language, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the 
inclusion of the statement ‘[t]he Partnership believes that funds . . . will be sufficient to 
cover all of its debt service (interest and principal)’ would influence a reasonable investor’s 
investment decision.”). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 122-23. 
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Investors who know that courts routinely apply the bespeaks caution 
doctrine to insulate forward-looking statements from liability will 
reasonably conclude that forward-looking statements are consequently 
unreliable and should be disregarded.  Therefore, the bespeaks caution 
doctrine, despite its shaky premise, arguably becomes true. 
c. The Potential Legal Circularity of the Trivial Matters 
Doctrine 
Under the trivial matters doctrine, a misstatement or omission 
regarding a small percentage of total sales or revenues is immaterial as a 
matter of law.  This doctrine recognizes that some information is 
substantively unimportant to investors because “investors only care about 
big pieces of the firm.”80  This component of the trivial matters doctrine is 
not legally circular because whether a reasonable investor would actually 
care about the substance of a piece of data does not depend on prior 
precedent. 
This doctrine also affects the reliability factor of materiality, however, 
and this effect is arguably legally circular.  The trivial matters doctrine 
states that reasonable investors do not rely on statements to be exact and do 
not expect to be told about small variations from expectations.81  In short, 
according to this doctrine, reasonable investors read in some wiggle room.  
The premise of the doctrine is certainly debatable.  Scholars have identified 
various scenarios in which a small change in numbers would arguably be 
important to investors, including when the misstatement is persistent,82 
when a statistically tiny percentage is nonetheless worth a large amount of 
money,83 when a small loss serves as a bellwether,84 and when the market is 
 
 80.  See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 125 (citing cases applying the trivial 
matters doctrine, “[t]he final materiality heuristic posits that claims of nondisclosures or 
misstatements with respect to matters involving no more than small percentage of total sales 
or revenues (or some other variable) fail because the information at issue is immaterial as a 
matter of law.  The rationale, once again, is simple.  Such trivial bits of information do not 
play a role in the investment decisions of reasonable investors because they relate to a small 
aspect of the business.”). 
 81.  See David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 537, 579 (2006) [hereinafter Hoffman, The “Duty”] (explaining that, under the “trivial 
matters” technique, “courts hold presumptively immaterial nondisclosures relating to small 
percentages of total sales or revenues.”).  
 82.  See Park, supra note 42, at 540-46 (explaining that, under fundamental analysis, 
even a small financial misstatement can be important if it is persistent, thus affecting the 
market’s assessment of future earnings). 
 83.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 126 (“It is simply implausible that all 
reasonable investors ignore information about small aspects of the business.  A statistically 
tiny percentage of a major corporation, moreover, can be worth hundreds of millions of 
COUTURE_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  8:40 PM 
2015]     MATERIALITY AND A THEORY OF LEGAL CIRCULARITY 475 
 
fragile.85  Yet, once investors know that courts often apply the trivial 
matters doctrine, they reasonably should read in some wiggle room because 
they know that companies have no liability incentive to be exact.  In short, 
the trivial matters doctrine, even if unfounded at one time, has become true. 
2. The Two Analytical Steps Underlying the Potential 
Legal Circularity Materiality 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the potential legal circularity 
of materiality is intuitive.  This section delves deeper, identifying the two 
analytical steps that underlie the legal circularity of materiality.  The first 
analytical step is the proposition that courts’ materiality decisions influence 
the behavior of future investors.  The second analytical step is that future 
investors act reasonably in being so influenced.  This step completes the 
circle because the materiality test itself depends on the behavior of 
reasonable investors.  Therefore, if courts’ materiality decisions influence 
the behavior of future reasonable investors, courts’ materiality decisions 
operate as self-fulfilling prophecies. 
a. Step One:  Courts’ Materiality Rulings Potentially Influence 
the Behavior of Future Investors 
The first analytical step in the legal circularity of materiality is the 
proposition that courts’ materiality rulings potentially influence the 
behavior of future investors.  This proposition is consistent with the general 
guidance function of adjudication, as explained by Professor Frederick 
Schauer: 
 
Although it thus appears that the guidance function is one rarely 
treated as primary in the adjudicative process, there is no reason it 
could not be so, and no reason that a judge could not see her role 
primarily as an instructor or guider of future decisions by 
subordinate decisionmakers.  Were that the case, and when that is 
 
dollars.”). 
 84.  Id. at 126 (“Finally, losses in small areas can provide investors with important 
information about the direction of the company’s fortunes.  We may well be wrong about 
what investors think is important, but it seems implausible that nonexpert judges (and 
nonexpert clerks) have a more sophisticated understanding of investor behavior and market 
dynamics.”). 
 85.  Sauer, supra note 12, at 329 (“The bubble market of the 1990s provided numerous 
examples of stocks so fragile they could be shattered by even a slight shortfall from 
expected earnings.  Nor do we lack more recent instances of extreme investor sensitivity to 
numerically small disappointments.”). 
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the case, the judicial opinion takes on special importance, for it is 
no longer a mere justification for a decision already made, and no 
longer just part of an internal discourse among lawyers, judges, 
and law professors, but is rather a document having much the 
character of a statute or a regulation, and sharing the common 
statutory or regulatory goals of making clear in advance just what 
conduct is permitted and what is prohibited.86 
 
This guidance function is intuitive, and many securities scholars have 
recognized that courts’ materiality rulings potentially guide the behavior of 
future investors.87 
The reasonable investor test for materiality is normative, based on 
how investors should act rather than how they actually act.88  Like any 
normative standard with an incentive structure in place, the materiality 
standard “may be used to help channel investor behavior toward that 
norm.”89  The reasonable investor test, by granting recovery to those who 
act consistently with the normative standard and by denying recovery to 
those who do not, guides the behavior of investors.90  In fact, Professor 
 
 86.  Frederick Schauer, Judicial Self-Understanding and the Internalization of 
Constitutional Rules, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 766 (1990). 
     87.    See infra notes 88-99. 
 88.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 563 (“Courts’ equation of reasonableness 
with rationality is a normative move.  It transforms materiality from a requirement that 
reflects ordinary behavior to one that may instead sanction it.”); see also Donald C. 
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets:  A Behavioral Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 184 (2002) [hereinafter Langevoort, Taming] 
(discussing the distinction between a normative standard of materiality and a descriptive 
one). 
 89.  Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 323; see also Hoffman, The 
“Duty,” supra note 79, at 586 (“These findings suggest that courts are not using materiality 
to effect mere conservative ends nor to change corporate behavior, but instead to change the 
behavior of prospective plaintiffs—ordinary investors in the capital markets.  That is, 
because plaintiff identity is so important, and because materiality has moved toward a set of 
bright-line rules, ordinary investors will have strong incentives to conform their conduct to 
that deemed reasonable by courts or be denied recovery.”). 
 90.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 594 (“The shift in the rationale for 
findings of presumed immateriality over time from standards to bright-line rules suggests 
that materiality is evolving toward a formal choice:  investors must behave in a certain way 
or suffer the consequences.”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk:  
Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated 
Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 672 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Selling Hope] 
(discussing the argument that “[p]enalizing undue trust is thus simply a way to create a legal 
incentive toward cognitive diligence and discourage reliance on motivated heuristics and 
biases.”). 
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David A. Hoffman has gone so far as to suggest that this incentive structure 
creates a “legal duty to be a rational shareholder.”91 
The guidance role of the materiality standard is consistent with the 
legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.  After studying the floor 
debates on these acts, Mr. Walsh characterized the rhetoric about protecting 
only those investors who had exercised reasonable care as, in some ways, 
“didactic.”92  In other words, “[i]nvestors must be taught to conduct 
themselves properly.”93  Indeed, one representative foreshadowed Professor 
Hoffman’s legal duty contention by explaining that the legislation “worked 
not by allowing but by ‘requiring’ the purchaser to exercise judgment in 
regards to his or her own investments.”94 
A higher materiality standard, which denies recovery to more 
investors, arguably encourages investors to be less trusting.95  As explained 
by Professor Jennifer O’Hare, a court’s ruling that statements are non-
actionable puffery “is sending a message to investors that they cannot 
believe the company’s disclosure[s].”96  At the extreme, this is a return to 
the doctrine of caveat emptor.97 
A lower materiality standard, which grants recovery to more investors, 
arguably encourages investors to be more gullible.  As Professor Barbara 
Black explained (albeit skeptically), “[c]ourts apparently believe that if we 
treat investors like children, nitwits, or rubes, they will act that way.”98  
 
 91.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 595 (“[W]e should see presumed 
immateriality as an attempt by courts to shape the ordinary relationship between 
corporations and investors, not merely the contours of recovery in litigation.”). 
 92.  Walsh, supra note 9, at 219 (citing examples from the legislative history of the 
1933 and 1934 Acts). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. (citing 77 CONG. REC. 2931 (1933) (statement of Rep Wolverton)). 
 95.  O’Hare, supra note 54, at 1725-26 (“If courts continue to apply the puffery 
defense, investors will be forced to question the veracity of a company’s optimistic 
statements, leading to a distrustful investment environment based on the doctrine of caveat 
emptor.”); Padfield, Is Puffery Material?, supra note 74, at 360 (“In this way, the [puffery] 
doctrine may lead to an increase in speech that impedes the efficient flow of capital by 
reducing the trust investors have in the market.”). 
 96.  O’Hare, supra note 54, at 1723 (“The company argues that the officer’s statement 
constituted non-actionable puffery.  If a court agrees, then it is sending a message to 
investors that they cannot believe the company’s disclosure.  It is saying that, even though 
the company’s officer said that the transaction was going ‘well,’ investors should have 
second-guessed the honesty of the officer and the accuracy of the statement.”). 
 97.  Id. (“In effect, the court is signaling a return to the doctrine of caveat emptor, a 
result clearly at odds with the policies of the federal securities laws.”); Padfield, Immaterial 
Lies, supra note 40, at 147 (arguing that “overdependence on materiality safety valves . . . 
arguably sends the message to executives that it is often okay to embellish the truth—and 
sends the message to investors that they should adopt an attitude of caveat emptor (‘buyer 
beware’) when it comes to the statements of corporate executives.”). 
 98.  Barbara Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection:  Reasonable 
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Professor Joan MacLeod Heminway similarly recognized this possibility, 
when discussing whether the materiality standard should be lowered to 
reflect the actual behavior of investors:  “Assuming their behaviors are 
commonplace or normal, do we want to protect (and thereby encourage) 
behaviors exhibited by underclass investors, moody investors, moral 
investors, or female investors by terming their behaviors ‘reasonable’ or by 
otherwise altering the materiality standard to reflect their behaviors?”99 
Therefore, in sum, courts’ rulings on the element of materiality 
potentially influence the investment behavior of future investors, 
encouraging them to be more gullible or to be less trusting.  This is the first 
step in the legal circularity of materiality. 
b. Step Two:  Reasonable Investors Are Arguably Influenced by 
Prior Courts’ Materiality Rulings 
The second analytical step in the legal circularity of materiality is the 
proposition that reasonable investors are arguably influenced by prior court 
rulings on materiality.  The first step explains that this influence exists; this 
second step explains that this influence is reasonable. 
Reasonable investors, when assessing whether a representation is 
important to their investment decisions, arguably consider whether the 
speaker would be subject to securities fraud liability if the representation 
were false.  If so, a reasonable investor is more likely to give the 
representation credence; if not, a reasonable investor is more likely to 
disregard it.  Professor O’Hare explained why the potential for securities 
fraud liability matters to reasonable investors as follows: 
 
[T]he anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws make it 
more likely that a reasonable investor would believe the 
company’s optimistic statements.  Investors know that the 
securities industry is highly regulated.  They understand that a 
company risks substantial liability for false or misleading 
statements.  Therefore, it is more reasonable for investors to 
believe a company’s statements made in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security than statements made by a seller in 
 
Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1493, 1505 (2013) (acknowledging this 
policy consideration while not agreeing that it should govern) (“What then are the policy 
considerations to support a ‘reasonable investor’ standard that requires greater rationality 
than most investors possess?  Courts have not engaged in extensive policy analysis, but it 
appears that courts want people to make sensible investment decisions, and so they will 
deny them any recovery for their losses unless they live up to the ‘reasonable investor’ 
standard.”). 
 99.  Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 326 (emphasis added). 
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connection with the sale of a tangible product.100 
 
Therefore, a reasonable investor potentially considers a speaker’s potential 
liability for falsity when deciding whether to give the speaker’s 
representations any weight. 
Reasonable investors are already charged with certain skills and 
knowledge.  For example, reasonable investors are assumed to grasp the 
time-value of money,101 the taxation of different investments,102 basic 
accounting treatment,103 diversification and risk,104 the nature of margin 
accounts,105 and the security industry’s compensation structure.106  In 
addition, reasonable investors are assumed to know “all publicly available 
information” relevant to the investment,107 including the economic 
conditions of various regions,108 and to draw on that information to 
compare various investment options.109 
Reasonable investors could arguably likewise be charged with 
knowledge of how courts interpret the materiality element and how that 
interpretation affects a speaker’s potential for securities fraud liability.  
Court opinions are public records,110 and legal commentary is publicly 
 
 100.  O’Hare, supra note 54, at 1722. 
 101.  Black, supra note 98, at 1494-95; Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 
301 (citing authority); Sachs, supra note 42, at 475-76 (citing examples). 
 102.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 582 (citing examples) 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Black, supra note 98, at 1494-95; Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 
301 (citing authority). 
 105.  Black, supra note 98, at 1494-95. 
 106.  Id.; Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 301 (citing authority). 
 107.  Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 306 (“Even if not sophisticated, a 
reasonable investor certainly is informed.  In fact, the Securities Act of 1933, as amended 
(‘1933 Act’), and the 1934 Act, by using disclosure as a vehicle for effectuating the 
promotion of investor protection and market integrity, effectively ordain that the reasonable 
investor must be informed.  Accordingly, an informed investor incorporates all publicly 
available information into her decision making.”). 
 108.  In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 377 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“As the reasonable investor should have known of the economic downturn in the 
Northeast at that time, the inclusion of this information would not have substantively altered 
the total mix of information the prospectus provided to investors.”). 
 109.  Id. at 375-76 (“The federal securities laws do not ordain that the issuer of a security 
compare itself in myriad ways to its competitors . . . [I]t is precisely and uniquely the 
function of the prudent investor, not the issuer of securities, to make such comparisons 
among investments.”) (emphasis in original). 
 110.  See, e.g., PACER, www.pacer.gov (“Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER) is an electronic public access service that allows users to obtain case and docket 
information online from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts, and the PACER 
Case Locator.  PACER is provided by the Federal Judiciary in keeping with its commitment 
to providing public access to court information via a centralized service.”). 
COUTURE_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  8:40 PM 
480 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
available in various fora, including in law journals.  Moreover, it is not 
unprecedented to assume that various non-attorney actors have a nuanced 
understanding of the current state of the case law.  For example, state 
officials’ qualified immunity to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is lost “if the 
constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at 
the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or should have known of 
that right, and if they knew or should have known that their conduct 
violated the constitutional norm,”111 as demonstrated by the case law at the 
time of the officials’ conduct.112  As another example, when considering a 
criminal defendant’s claim that a statute is unconstitutionally vague, courts 
sometimes engage in a complex analysis of the state of the case law, 
rejecting vagueness claims when that case law backdrop supports a clear 
interpretation of the statute.113 
This assumes, of course, that courts’ treatment of materiality is 
sufficiently coherent to be helpful to investors.  Indeed, many scholars have 
criticized courts’ materiality decisions as incoherent and, hence, unhelpful 
for planning purposes.114  Just because courts’ materiality assessments are 
 
 111.  Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978). 
 112.  See id. at 565 (“Whether the state of the law is evaluated by reference to the 
opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court, there was no 
‘clearly established’ First and Fourteenth Amendment right with respect to the 
correspondence of convicted prisoners in 1971-1972.  As a matter of law, therefore, there 
was no basis for rejecting the immunity defense on the ground that petitioners knew or 
should have known that their alleged conduct violated a constitutional right.”); Cagle v. 
Gilley, 957 F.2d 1347, 1348 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Ordinarily, to find a clearly established 
constitutional right, a district court within the Sixth Circuit must find binding precedent 
from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, or from itself.  Although decisions of other 
courts can clearly establish the law, such decisions must both point unmistakenly to the 
unconstitutionality of the conduct and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct 
authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct was 
unconstitutional.”). 
 113.  E.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2929-30 (2010) (“Satisfied that 
Congress, by enacting § 1346, ‘meant to reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services 
law,’ we have surveyed that case law.  In parsing the Courts of Appeals decisions, we 
acknowledge that Skilling’s vagueness challenge has force, for honest-services decisions 
preceding McNally were not models of clarity or consistency . . . . Although some 
applications of the pre-McNally honest-services doctrine occasioned disagreement among 
the Courts of Appeals, these cases do not cloud the doctrine’s solid core:  The ‘vast 
majority’ of the honest-services cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary 
duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes.”). 
 114.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1153 (“[A]pplicable decisional 
law and scholarship often do not permit a definitive determination as to the materiality of 
facts or events, even if recurring.  Accordingly, the widespread acceptance of the TSC 
Industries standard is of small comfort.”); id. at 1165 (“Because cases are fact-specific, a 
conclusive determination regarding materiality only can be made if one locates a case 
completely on point with the fact scenario in the case being analyzed.  While occasionally 
(and luckily) a case on point can be located, it is a relatively rare occurrence.  Even an 
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not always crystalline does not mean, however, that certain fact patterns 
have not been repeated often enough to provide guidance.115 
In sum, then, there is support for both analytical steps underlying the 
legal circularity of materiality.  Courts’ materiality decisions arguably 
influence the behavior of future investors, and that influence is arguably 
reasonable on the part of future investors.  Therefore, courts’ materiality 
determinations potentially operate as self-fulfilling prophecies. 
3. An Assessment of the Descriptiveness of the Legal 
Circularity of Materiality 
The potential legal circularity of materiality begs the question of 
whether courts are presently treating materiality as circular.  Namely, when 
making materiality determinations, are courts assuming that their 
hypothetical reasonable investors are adjusting their behavior based on the 
state of the law of materiality? 
The evidence is mixed.  No court has explicitly recognized the 
potential legal circularity of materiality.  Courts do, however, frequently 
rely on long string cites of previous precedent when ruling that certain 
representations are immaterial as a matter of law.116  Certainly, courts could 
merely be citing this precedent as a guide to their own assessments of 
representations’ materiality, but the implication is that––in light of many 
previous courts that have so ruled––reasonable investors would have 
known better than to rely on these representations. 
Moreover, several scholars have noted that courts engage in very little 
analysis of materiality, instead relying on rules of thumb.117  Again, this 
lack of extensive analysis by the courts––rather than a symptom of courts’ 
 
exhausting and exhaustive search for decisional law may not yield a case or group of cases 
affording a clear answer.”); Sauer, supra note 12, at 319 (“Materiality determinations in 
individual cases tend to be so fact-specific that the accumulated body of published case law 
provides limited guidance for decision-making.”). 
 115.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1198-99 (“Existing decisional 
law is another valuable source for more concrete materiality measurement principles.  For 
example, certain fact patterns repeat themselves in cases decided by a number of different 
federal district or circuit courts.  These courts may have identified applicable materiality 
elements and used methods of measurement that Congress, the SEC, or other courts can use 
in providing more specific advice on materiality.”). 
 116.  E.g., Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1119-20 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing a 
string of eight other opinions in support of the puffery doctrine); In re Donald J. Trump 
Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing six other opinions 
in support of adoption of the bespeaks caution doctrine) (“We are persuaded by the ratio 
decidendi of these cases and will apply bespeaks caution to the facts before us.”). 
   117.    See infra notes 118-119. 
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taking shortcuts118 or of courts’ engaging in herding behavior119––could 
instead be evidence that courts are charging their hypothetical reasonable 
investors with knowledge of these rules of thumb.  What scholars have 
identified as substantive law heuristics and herding could actually be courts 
applying the legal circularity of materiality. 
Of course, separate and apart from whether courts are actually 
applying the legal circularity of materiality is whether courts should be 
doing so.  This Article now turns to that question, first by positing a 
broader Theory of Legal Circularity and then by applying that theory in the 
context of materiality. 
II. A THEORY OF LEGAL CIRCULARITY 
Materiality is not the only potentially circular legal doctrine.  Indeed, 
other scholars, most notably Professor Michael Abramowicz in his seminal 
article titled “Constitutional Circularity,”120 have identified other legal 
doctrines that operate as self-fulfilling prophecies.  No scholar has 
proposed an overarching theory to identify and assess potentially circular 
legal doctrines, and this Article seeks to fill this void. 
In particular, this Article proposes a two-step Theory of Legal 
Circularity.  The first step is a Legal Circularity Test to identify doctrines 
that are potentially legally circular.  Various legal doctrines satisfy this test, 
including materiality and the doctrines identified by Professor Abramowicz 
 
 118.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 119-26 (arguing that the materiality 
doctrines of puffery, bespeaks caution, and trivial matters are substantive law heuristics 
because courts apply these doctrines with almost no analysis, instead merely citing to the 
fact that other courts have so held). 
 119.  Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated, supra note 43, at 312-13 (“In this spirit, let me 
offer a slight modification of the authors’ story that seems less insulting to the judiciary but 
still captures their thrust.  Assume that judges have substantially differing dispositions 
toward securities cases, with some highly motivated, some uninterested, and many in 
between.  A defense is initially recognized, as I suggested above, in common sense form, 
perhaps even by the most motivated of judges.  Thereafter, however, it is adopted and 
extended by a mindless judge or two.  What happens then is that precedent builds that 
gradually attracts more of those in the middle.  This attraction is mainly because of the 
institutionally legitimate pull of precedent, aided by only a slight dose of self-serving 
inference.  As the attraction grows, the precedent gradually becomes more a self-fulfilling 
prophecy and begins to crowd out the efforts of the more diligent judges.  In fact, this strikes 
me as an apt description of the doctrinal reality described earlier, wherein many judges 
today are explicitly critical of the heuristics and much hard work still gets done in securities 
cases, but those heuristics gradually exert more and more strength disproportionate to their 
logic as the case law evolves.  In other words, one need not make strong assumptions about 
slothful judicial dispositions to get the effect we observe: a mild tendency in the judiciary as 
a whole is enough to generate a perceptible bias in the law over time.”). 
 120.  Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
COUTURE_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  8:40 PM 
2015]     MATERIALITY AND A THEORY OF LEGAL CIRCULARITY 483 
 
and other scholars.  Merely because a legal doctrine is potentially legally 
circular, however, does not mean that courts and scholars should embrace 
that circularity.  Therefore, the second step is a Framework to Assess Legal 
Circularity.  This framework, drawing from the rich scholarship on the 
distinct but similar concepts of stare decisis, substantive law heuristics, and 
herding, identifies three factors to assess in order to weigh the pros and 
cons of adopting legal circularity.  This framework is comprehensive and 
complex, yielding a different result depending on the legal doctrine at 
issue.  The two steps of the Theory of Legal Circularity are discussed 
below. 
A. Legal Circularity Test 
As the first step of the Theory of Legal Circularity, this Article 
proposes the following Legal Circularity Test to identify legal doctrines 
that are potentially circular.  A legal doctrine is potentially circular if:  (1) 
the legal doctrine incorporates the behavior or attitude of a population or 
person, either hypothetical or real; and (2) the subject population or person 
either would (if hypothetical) or does (if real) consider prior precedent 
interpreting the legal doctrine when choosing said behavior or when 
adopting said attitude. 
Materiality fits within the Legal Circularity Test.  First, the definition 
of materiality incorporates the investment behavior of a hypothetical 
reasonable investor.  Second, a hypothetical reasonable investor would 
arguably consider prior precedent interpreting materiality when 
investing.121 
Materiality is not alone, however.  Indeed, Professor Abramowicz, 
drawing on the work of other scholars, has identified several constitutional 
doctrines that are likewise circular.122  He explained: 
 
For the Court, the Constitution’s meaning may depend not just on 
traditional factors like text and enactment history, but also on 
how citizens, either generally or as relevant groups, have come to 
understand the Constitution . . . .  But a decision also may have an 
indirect effect, changing what the people think the provision 
means.  If what a provision means depends in part on what people 
currently think it means, then constitutional law at times can be 
self-fulfilling prophecy.123 
 
 
 121.  See supra Part I.C. 
 122.  Abramowicz, supra note 120. 
 123.  Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 7-8. 
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Each of the following constitutional doctrines that Professor 
Abramowicz and other scholars have identified also satisfies the Legal 
Circularity Test. First, the Fourth Amendment analysis of whether a person 
has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy”124 is 
arguably legally circular because “someone can have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a 
search in that area would be unreasonable.”125  This Fourth Amendment 
analysis satisfies the Legal Circularity Test because it incorporates the 
privacy expectations of a reasonable person, and a reasonable person would 
consider prior Fourth Amendment precedent when considering whether he 
or she has an expectation of privacy. 
Second, the takings analysis of whether governmental action has 
interfered with “reasonable investment backed expectations”126 is arguably 
legally circular because the reasonableness of any such expectation is 
informed by prior takings precedent:  “If case law indicates that the 
government can take a particular type of property (or opportunity for the 
use of property) without compensation, then the property owner ought not 
have expectations of profit.”127  This takings analysis satisfies the Legal 
 
 124.  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment 
analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy.’ Katz posits a two-part inquiry:  first, has the individual manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?  Second, is society willing to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable?”). 
 125.  Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 60-61 (citing the work of other scholars 
recognizing the potential circularity of the concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy”) 
(“Thus, . . . the Court seems to be saying that what counts as reasonable depends on what 
the Court has previously held.”); see also Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally 
Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 19, 33 (1997) (“The circularity of 
this grounding of the law on the principle of protecting reasonable expectations cannot, I 
believe, be eliminated altogether.”). 
 126.  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979) (citation omitted) (“As 
was recently pointed out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, this Court 
has generally ‘been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and 
fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the 
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.’  Rather, 
it has examined the ‘taking’ question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that 
have identified several factors—such as the economic impact of the regulation, its 
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action—that have particular significance.”). 
 127.  Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 63 (citing the work of other scholars recognizing 
the potential circularity of the concept of “reasonable investment-backed expectations”); see 
also Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law:  Considering Inherent 
Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56 (1996) (“[T]he reasonable expectations model 
is hopelessly circular, both in theory and in practice.  In theory, reasonable expectations are 
founded on perceptions of what the law will protect, so the law’s protections cannot be 
based on reasonable expectations.”). 
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Circularity Test because it incorporates the reasonable investment 
expectations of the property owner, and a reasonable property owner would 
consider prior takings precedent when formulating investment 
expectations. 
Third, the due process “minimum contacts” analysis is potentially 
legally circular.  That analysis depends on whether “the defendant’s 
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he [or she] 
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”128  Yet, a 
defendant’s reasonable anticipation of being haled into court in a 
jurisdiction depends on prior precedent explaining the degree and nature of 
contacts that would subject one to personal jurisdiction.129  The minimum 
contacts analysis satisfies the Legal Circularity Test because it depends on 
a person’s reasonable expectations of being subject to personal jurisdiction, 
and a reasonable person’s expectations are informed by prior precedent on 
the scope of personal jurisdiction. 
Fourth, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment is arguably legally circular because it “must draw its meaning 
 
 128.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1980) (“This 
is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant.  But the foreseeability that is 
critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into 
the forum State.  Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”); 4 FED. 
PRAC. & PROC. § 1067 (3d ed. 2013) (“As countless cases decided in the years since the 
International Shoe decision demonstrate, the Court’s reference to the defendant’s ‘minimum 
contacts’ with the forum and its invocation of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice’ have become centerpieces for the analysis and application of the Constitution’s due 
process limitations on attempts to assert in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”). 
 129.  Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 64 (citing other scholars and courts recognizing 
the potential circularity of the personal jurisdiction analysis) (“A similar phenomenon exists 
in constitutional civil procedure.  Whether a state may assert jurisdiction over a defendant 
consistent with the Due Process Clause depends in part on whether the defendant could 
justifiably have expected to be haled into that state’s courts.  Commentators have noted that 
this formulation also seems to be circular.”); see also, David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction 
and the Internet––Proposed Limits on State Jurisdiction over Data Communications in Tort 
Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95, 136 (1998) (“Defendants only have reasonable expectations about 
where they will be haled into court because courts have created such expectations.  Planning 
and reliance thus result in an empty principle to define the boundaries of jurisdiction.  Once 
a court changes those boundaries, expectations change.  Thus, reasonable expectations are 
not useful in defining boundaries—only in maintaining the status quo.  Carried to its 
extreme, a reasonable expectations principle would operate similarly to qualified 
immunity—no jurisdiction would exist over a defendant unless his or her actions established 
jurisdiction under clearly established doctrine.”). 
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from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society,”130 and “judicial doctrine that allows or prohibits certain 
forms of punishment affects whether these forms of punishment meet 
society’s evolving standards of decency.”131  The cruel and unusual 
punishment analysis satisfies the Legal Circularity Test because it depends 
on society’s standards of decency, and society considers prior precedent on 
cruel and unusual punishment when formulating its decency standards. 
The potential for legal circularity is not limited to securities laws and 
the Constitution.  For instance, the common law negligence standard is 
arguably circular.  Under the Second Restatement of Torts’ conception of 
negligence, a non-negligent person must act like “a reasonable man under 
like circumstances.”132  An act is unreasonable if “the risk [of harm to 
another] is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the 
utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”133  The 
magnitude of the risk is measured by considering “the social value which 
the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled,”134 and the utility of 
the action is measured by considering “the social value which the law 
attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or protected by the 
conduct.”135  The referenced “law” includes decisional law.136  The 
negligence analysis satisfies the Legal Circularity Test because it depends 
on the risk-utility assessment of a reasonable person, and a reasonable 
person would consider prior negligence precedent when calculating the risk 
of harm and the utility of the action. 
 
 130.  Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 65 (citing other scholars recognizing the potential 
circularity of the cruel and unusual punishment analysis) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 101 (1958)) (“The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”).  
 131.  Id. 
 132.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (“Unless the actor is a child, the standard 
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man 
under like circumstances.”). 
 133.  Id. § 291 (“Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as 
involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the 
risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of 
the particular manner in which it is done.”). 
 134.  Id. § 293. 
 135.  Id. § 292. 
 136.  See id. § 292 cmt. (discussing the value attached by “a persistent course of 
decisions”). But see Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence:  Hand Formula 
Balancing, The Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 830 
(2001) (“Given the jury’s traditional role in applying the negligence standard, in most 
situations there will be no judicial decisions specifying the social value of particularly 
described interests.  As a practical matter, therefore, the best way to ascertain what social 
value the law attaches to an interest will usually be to consult popular opinion.”). 
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Except for the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, each of the above-identified examples of potentially circular 
legal doctrines includes the concept of “reasonableness,” which begs the 
question of whether reasonableness inquiries are always potentially legally 
circular.  This Article argues that, while the concept of reasonableness is 
especially susceptible to legal circularity because it depends on the 
hypothetical behavior of a rational actor (which often includes 
consideration of prior precedent), reasonableness inquiries are not per se 
legally circular.  For example, an element of a Title VII hostile work 
environment claim is whether a reasonable person would find the harassing 
conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working 
environment.137  In this context, it is unlikely that a reasonable employee 
would consider prior Title VII precedent when assessing for him or herself 
whether conditions rise to the level of constituting an abusive environment.  
As a further example, an element of the common law affirmative defense to 
homicide of self-defense is whether the defendant “reasonably believes that 
he is in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily 
harm.”138  It is unlikely that a reasonable person would consider prior self-
defense precedent when deciding whether to act in self-defense.139 
As the above examples demonstrate, the Legal Circularity Test is 
helpful to identify legal doctrines that have the potential to be legally 
circular.  Before moving on to the proposed Framework to Assess Legal 
Circularity, which analyzes whether courts and scholars should embrace a 
legal doctrine’s potential circularity, it is important for the sake of clarity to 
distinguish legal circularity from several similar, but different, concepts.  In 
brief, as discussed below, legal circularity does not involve the logical flaw 
of circular reasoning.  Additionally, although these related concepts shed 
light on the potential impacts of legal circularity, legal circularity differs 
from stare decisis, substantive law heuristics, and herding. 
 
 137.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“Conduct that is not severe or 
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment––an 
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive––is beyond Title VII’s 
purview.”). 
 138.  2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (15th ed. 2014). 
 139.  Accord Andrew Ingram, Note, Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-
Defense, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 425, 441 (2012) (“[J]udges should be wary when applying stare 
decisis in these [self-defense] cases lest the general principle drown in a sea of per se rules 
and exceptions.”). 
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1. The Distinction Between Legal Circularity and Circular 
Reasoning 
Circular reasoning is a logical flaw140 in which “the arguer illicitly 
uses the conclusion itself (or a closely related proposition) as a crucial 
piece of support, instead of justifying the conclusion on the basis of agreed-
upon facts and reasonable inferences.”141  Professor Lance J. Rips provides 
the following example of circular reasoning: 
 
If sentence S1 justifies sentence S2 and S2 justifies S1 in the same 
argument, then it is likely that the argument is circular.  But 
circularity can occur even when the arguer does not repeat S1 
verbatim.  At the very least, we must make room for the case in 
which S1 justifies S2 justifies S’1, where S1 and S’1 express the 
same proposition or claim.142 
 
The legal circularity identified by the Legal Circularity Test does not 
implicate this logical flaw because there is a temporal distinction between 
the earlier court decision establishing a proposition and the later court 
decision incorporating that earlier proposition into its analysis.  The earlier 
court decision changes the universe in which the later court operates.  
Using a shorthand similar to the one used by Professor Rips, the following 
is an example of legal circularity: An earlier court analyzes issue X and 
concludes S1.  A later court analyzes issue X, which depends on the fact 
that an earlier court concluded S1, and therefore likewise concludes S1. 
The legal circularity identified by the Legal Circularity Test does not 
use circular reasoning.  Rather, it refers to circularity in the sense of being a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.143  That being said, however, as discussed below in 
the proposed Framework to Assess Legal Circularity,144 legal circularity 
poses a similar risk of self-authentication of a “wrong” result to that posed 
by circular reasoning.145 
 
 140.  See Lance J. Rips, Circular Reasoning, 26 COGNITIVE SCI. 767, 768 (2002) 
(“Circularity is a defect in reasoning because it undermines correct attempts to justify a 
claim or an action.”). 
 141.  Id. at 767; see also DAVID KELLEY, THE ART OF REASONING 154 (3d ed. 1998) 
(defining a “circular argument” as “trying to support a proposition with an argument in 
which that proposition is a premise”). 
 142.  Rips, supra note 140, at 768. 
 143.  See Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 62 (distinguishing between doctrine that is 
“circular in a logical sense” and doctrine that “may tend to be self-fulfilling in an empirical 
sense”). 
 144.  See infra Part II.B. 
 145.  See Rips, supra note 140, at 768 (explaining that circular reasoning can “lead to 
narrow-mindedness, or even delusions, in which one’s beliefs about a topic are self-
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2. The Distinction Between Legal Circularity and Stare 
Decisis 
Stare decisis, which translates as “to stand by things decided,”146 
encompasses two propositions.  First, once a court has decided an issue, the 
court will not reexamine the decision in a later case, absent “urgent reasons 
and in exceptional cases;” second, lower courts are bound by the earlier-
decided rulings of higher courts.147 
Legal circularity is stronger than stare decisis, operating like a super-
charged stare decisis.  For example, under stare decisis, an earlier ruling 
that certain cautionary language renders a specific projection immaterial as 
a matter of law would be binding in the future on the same and lower 
courts, absent exceptional circumstances compelling reversal.  Under legal 
circularity, the earlier ruling would actually affect the later application of 
the materiality test because, in light of the earlier ruling that the projection 
was not actionable even if false, no reasonable investor would have 
considered the projection to be important in making an investment 
decision.  Under legal circularity, the later court is not merely bound by the 
earlier ruling; the later court’s application of the test is impacted by the 
paradigm shift that the earlier ruling accomplished.  Although stare decisis 
contains the potential for a later court to differentiate the earlier ruling or to 
overrule it under extraordinary circumstances, legal circularity is far 
stickier.  Therefore, although legal circularity differs from stare decisis, the 
impacts of stare decisis are arguably present under, or even heightened by, 
legal circularity.  As such, the rich scholarship on the pros and cons of stare 
decisis148 informs the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity.149 
 
authenticating, sealed off from evidence that might cast doubt upon them”). 
 146.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). 
 147.  WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 321 (3d ed. 
1914) (“The rule of adherence to judicial precedents finds its expression in the doctrine of 
stare decisis.  This doctrine is simply that, when a point or principle of law has been once 
officially decided or settled by the ruling of a competent court in a case in which it is 
directly and necessarily involved, it will no longer be considered as open to examination or 
to a new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are bound to follow its 
adjudications, unless it be for urgent reasons and in exceptional cases.”); Goutam U. Jois, 
Stare Decisis Is Cognition Error, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 71 (2009) (“Stare decisis may have 
a horizontal component (where a court follows its own earlier-decided cases) and a vertical 
component (where a lower court follows a higher court’s earlier decided cases).”); Caleb 
Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) 
(“American courts of last resort recognize a rebuttable presumption against overruling their 
own past decisions.”). 
 148.  E.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:  The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Jois, supra note 147; 
Nelson, supra note 147. 
 149.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the framework to assess legal circularity). 
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3. The Distinction Between Legal Circularity and 
Substantive Law Heuristics 
Substantive law heuristics are “doctrinal rules of thumb enabling a 
judge to avoid analysis of a case’s full complexities.”150  As explained by 
Professors Bainbridge and Gulati, judges are faced with myriad 
“institutional constraints that give judges incentives to eliminate securities 
cases from their dockets with minimal effort,” thus heightening the appeal 
of substantive heuristics.151  These constraints include workload, skill, and 
knowledge.152  In addition, as argued by Professor Hillary A. Sale, judges 
are tempted by the benefits of creating and using substantive heuristics, 
including popularity with a particular class of litigants (such as the defense 
bar) and subsequent citation by other courts.153  Therefore, judges arguably 
have an incentive to rely on substantive heuristics to resolve cases.154 
Substantive heuristics develop in two steps.  First, an appellate court 
creates a heuristic when faced with (1) a complex and vague substantive 
question, (2) factual findings from the district court, and (3) an intuitively 
sensible rule of thumb that allows for a quick and easy determination.155  
Second, the heuristic is adopted and used by other courts,156 with its 
attractiveness growing as it becomes “well-established.”157  The heuristic 
becomes widely used by courts, with the support of a long string-cite, 
without the need to engage in in-depth analysis.158 
 
 150.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 83. 
 151.  Id. at 88. 
 152.  Id. at 100; Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 905 
(2002) (“Judges are busy people.  District court judges are especially busy people who exist 
in very noisy environments.  They have crowded dockets and limited courtroom time.  In 
addition to keeping track of their schedules and those of all the cases on their dockets, they 
must cope with motions and trials.  Just like other busy “managers,” judges find ways to 
meet the demands of their jobs through the use of cognitive biases.  These cognitive biases 
are the same types of shortcuts, or heuristics, that we all develop to cope with the multiple 
decisions we must make on a daily basis.”). 
 153.  Sale, supra note 152, at 909-14. 
 154.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 90 (“[W]e argue that judges have an 
incentive to rely on standard-based doctrines that can be used to dispose of a wide variety of 
cases on simple threshold issues––such outcomes are ‘good enough,’ but avoid the need to 
decide more complex and difficult issues.”). 
 155.  Id. at 114-15. 
 156.  Sale, supra note 152, at 955-56 (“[I]t provides courts with a certain comfort level 
in the opinions they draft.  That is, precedent allows courts to avoid mistakes and reversal.  
Combining their ease of application with the nature of precedent further explains why these 
heuristics have flourished and why they are likely to continue to do so.”). 
 157.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 116-17; id. at 117 (“[T]he legitimacy of 
using a specific heuristic increases as it becomes more widely adopted.  In turn, as the 
heuristic becomes more legitimate, the incentive to use it increases.”). 
 158.   Id. at 115-16. 
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Legal circularity differs from substantive heuristics, but its usage 
mimics that of substantive heuristics.  Under legal circularity, subsequent 
courts look to courts’ prior rulings––not for shortcuts––but because those 
rulings change the landscape under which the parties operate.  When courts 
apply legal circularity, like when they apply substantive heuristics, it is 
more likely that later rulings will coincide with earlier rulings without the 
need for extensive analysis.  Because courts’ reliance on legal circularity 
and on substantive heuristics lead to similar results, the rich scholarship 
discussing the effects of substantive heuristics159 informs the Framework to 
Assess Legal Circularity.160 
4. The Distinction Between Legal Circularity and Herding 
 Herding, which is also referred to as “informational cascades,” occurs 
“among agents when their decisions are decreasingly determined by their 
own information and increasingly determined by the actions of others.”161  
Courts arguably engage in herding by relying on the weight of precedent, 
even when that precedent is merely persuasive, rather than engaging in 
independent decision-making.162  Professors Andrew W. Daughety and 
Jennifer F. Reinganum modeled the potential herding behavior of courts as 
follows: 
 
We model appeal courts as Bayesian decision makers with 
private information about a supreme court’s interpretation of the 
law; each court also observes the previous decisions of other 
appeals courts in similar cases.  Such “persuasive influence” can 
cause “herding” behavior by later appeals courts as decisions 
progressively rely more on previous decisions and less on a 
court’s private information.163 
 
 
 159.  E.g., id. (describing and explaining the substantive heuristics of securities class 
action cases); Sale, supra note 152 (detailing the relationship between judges’ busy 
schedules and their cognitive biases). 
 160.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the framework to assess legal circularity). 
 161.  Andrew W. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment:  
Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158, 159 
(1999). 
 162.  Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades:  An Appraisal, 73 CAL. L. REV. 87, 94 (1999) 
(“[A]s judges learn information from previous holdings, they may rationally begin to treat 
such holdings as binding, even if not formally required to do so, and even if the case they 
actually hear suggests a contrary outcome.”). 
 163.  Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 161, at 158. 
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It is debatable whether courts actually engage in herding behavior.  
Professors Daughety and Reinganum’s model suggests that herding by 
courts is theoretically possible, and they identify one example where courts 
arguably did engage in herding.  In that example, a series of United States 
Courts of Appeal held that although the Coal Industry Retiree Health 
Benefit Act applied retroactively, it did not violate the Constitution.164  
“Each succeeding appeals court opinion referenced all the previous 
decisions.  Moreover, each opinion became progressively shorter . . . and 
applied progressively similar criteria to reach the same conclusion.”165  The 
Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the retroactive application of the 
Coal Act was indeed unconstitutional.166  Professors Daughety and 
Reinganum conclude that the earlier appeals court decisions “might reflect 
overdependence on the public signals being created by the sequence of 
appeals courts’ decisions.”167  Professor Eric Talley, on the other hand, 
acknowledges that herding by courts is conceivable but argues that “the 
necessary conditions for such phenomena to occur appear somewhat 
implausible.”168 
Legal circularity differs from herding, but it mimics herding behavior.  
Under legal circularity, later courts do not follow persuasive authority 
because they are relying on the weight of precedent rather than engaging in 
independent decision-making.  Rather, under legal circularity, later courts 
recognize the impact of earlier precedent on the behavior of the 
hypothetical or real actors on whose behavior or attitude the legal test 
depends.  Legal circularity mimics herding, however, because later courts 
are likely to cite the weight of authority and then engage in little additional 
analysis.  Therefore, the rich scholarship addressing the impacts of 
precedential herding169 informs the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity, 
to which this Article now turns. 
 
 164.  Id. at 162 (citing authority). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion) (“Eastern cannot be forced to bear the expense of lifetime health benefits for 
miners based on its activities decades before those benefits were promised. Accordingly, in 
the specific circumstances of this case, we conclude that the Coal Act’s application to 
Eastern effects an unconstitutional taking.”); id. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part) (“Application of the Coal Act to Eastern would violate the 
proper bounds of settled due process principles, and I concur in the plurality’s conclusion 
that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.”). 
 167.  Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 161, at 165. 
 168.  Talley, supra note 162, at 92; id. at 105-14 (arguing that rule-boundedness, 
decisional opacity, judicial homogeneity, short judicial terms, flat hierarchies, and 
population stationarity are “necessary for a theory of precedential cascades to be both viable 
and significant”). 
 169.  E.g., id.; Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 161. 
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B. Framework to Assess Legal Circularity 
Under the Theory of Legal Circularity, the first step is to apply the 
Legal Circularity Test to identify legal doctrines that are potentially 
circular.  Merely because a legal doctrine is potentially legally circular, 
however, does not mean that courts and scholars should embrace that 
circularity.  Indeed, courts and scholars could affirmatively disavow the 
relevance of prior decisions on the decision-making of future actors, 
rejecting a doctrine’s potential legal circularity.  Therefore, the second step 
of the Theory of Legal Circularity is a proposed Framework to Assess 
Legal Circularity.  This framework draws from the rich scholarship on the 
similar impacts of stare decisis,170 substantive law heuristics,171 and 
precedential herding172 in order to identify three factors courts and scholars 
should analyze with respect to each potentially circular legal doctrine. 
In particular, in order to determine whether to embrace a legal 
doctrine’s potential legal circularity, courts and scholars should weigh (1) 
the risk of a “wrong” rule, (2) the effects of greater predictability, and (3) 
the import of reconceiving the courts’ role.  As discussed below, this 
framework is comprehensive and complex, yielding a different result 
depending on the legal doctrine at issue. 
1. Risk of a “Wrong” Rule 
The first factor in the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity is the 
risk that embracing a legal doctrine’s potential for circularity will lead to 
the entrenchment of a “wrong” rule, without sufficient means for 
correction. 
Legal circularity is path dependent, creating a first mover advantage.  
When a doctrine is legally circular, earlier courts’ rulings on an issue affect 
the landscape such that later courts are much more likely to rule 
accordingly.  For example, under the legal circularity of materiality, early 
courts’ rulings that a certain type of representation is per se immaterial 
would influence later courts’ analyses of whether a reasonable investor 
would find such a representation to be material.  Later reasonable investors 
would discount that type of representation as unreliable because the 
speaker bears no risk of liability for falsity, thus fulfilling the earlier courts’ 
prophecy.  A similar path dependency exists under stare decisis173 and 
 
170.    See supra note 148. 
171.    See supra note 159. 
  172.    See supra note 169. 
    173.   Jois, supra note 147, at 99 (noting that stare decisis “entrenches a tremendous first 
mover advantage”); Hathaway, supra note 148, at 630 (“Because the path of the common 
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herding,174 but the path dependency of legal circularity is arguably even 
more pronounced.  Under stare decisis and herding, later courts are bound 
or persuaded by earlier holdings.  Under legal circularity, later courts must 
actually incorporate the earlier courts’ holdings into their analyses, making 
it even more likely that later courts’ holdings will align with those of earlier 
courts. 
As a consequence, legal circularity can lead to the entrenchment of a 
“wrong” rule, just because it is the first rule.175  How early courts will rule, 
in the face of multiple possible outcomes, is unpredictable.176  In fact, early 
courts are arguably more likely to rule erroneously than later courts 
because they do not have the benefit of other courts’ guidance.177  Scholars 
have recognized that stare decisis, substantive law heuristics, and herding 
can likewise operate to entrench an erroneous rule.  Under stare decisis 
principles, even a demonstration of error is insufficient to overrule a past 
decision.178  When courts rely on substantive heuristics, they replace in-
depth analysis with cursory conclusions, potentially compounding earlier 
 
law is locked in at an early stage, early decisions are crucial to the direction of the law.”). 
 174.  Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 161, at 159, 181 (explaining that 
“interjurisdictional path dependence” leads to “vastly different sequences of holdings for the 
same set of cases, depending only on the order in which they arise”). 
 175.  Accord Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 8 (“An invocation of stare decisis may 
represent an assertion that the self-fulfilling prophecy has come true, that even if the Court 
was originally erroneous in interpreting the Constitution, the Constitution has come to mean 
what the Court said as a result of the Court’s having said it.”). 
 176.  See Hathaway, supra note 148, at 633-34 (arguing that the path dependency of 
stare decisis causes indeterminacy of outcome because it is unpredictable how early courts 
will rule on an issue) (“One might object to the claim that there are multiple possible 
outcomes and argue that there is usually (or at least often) one correct result in the law . . . .  
[I]t may be true that there is one correct legal rule as a normative matter.  But, as a 
descriptive matter, multiple outcomes are almost always possible.  Moreover, when it comes 
to cases that make it to court, the ‘right’ legal rule is often a matter of interpretation; cases in 
which the result is abundantly clear generally are settled long before they arrive in the 
courtroom.”). 
 177.  Nelson, supra note 147, at 57-58 (arguing that courts are “significantly more likely 
to be erroneous in cases of first impression than in later cases”). 
 178.  Id. at 1-2 (“American courts of last resort recognize a rebuttable presumption 
against overruling their own past decisions . . . .  [C]onventional wisdom now maintains that 
a purported demonstration of error is not enough to justify overruling a past decision.”); id. 
at 53 (“Instead, the court will follow precedent unless the precedent has proved unworkable 
or is causing other problems.  Only these sorts of practical disadvantages would justify 
overruling the precedent.”); id. at 53 (arguing that courts should “also overrule precedents 
when they deem the precedents demonstrably erroneous and see no special reason for 
adherence”); see also Talley, supra note 162, at 94 (“[T]he incentive for judges to emulate 
one another may stagnate the learning process, creating a precedent that fails to coincide 
with the normative objectives of each judge.”). 
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errors.179  When courts engage in herding behavior, they likewise follow 
the herd, even if the herd is incorrect.180 
The risk that legal circularity will entrench a “wrong” rule depends on 
whether the legal doctrine at issue is meant to embody intrinsic values or 
whether the doctrine is an arbitrary choice meant to solve a coordination 
problem.  In the former context, there is harm in the entrenchment of a 
“wrong” rule; in the latter context, there is no such thing as a “wrong” rule, 
as long as the rule allows parties to coordinate their behavior.  Professor 
Goutum U. Jois recognized a similar distinction when assessing the 
entrenchment impact of stare decisis: 
 
Maybe the law is “wrong” as measured against some idealized 
notion of humans’ preferences (if such an ideal could even be 
extrapolated), but this may not pose any practical problems. If the 
law is not meant to embody some intrinsic truth, but instead is 
merely meant to be stable and predictable, then this problem 
seems illusory.181 
 
This analysis draws on the distinction between natural laws and 
positive laws,182 and the scholarship in that area is helpful in making this 
 
 179.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 137 (“Instead of reflecting insight and 
judgment, opinions will be formulaic and citation-driven.  In terms of articulating and 
clarifying the law, such opinions do little or nothing . . . .  Accordingly, to the extent that 
these securities opinions make empirical claims about the behavior of firms and markets, 
there is a good chance that the information being conveyed is wrong.”); Sale, supra note 
152, at 906-07 (discussing how the usage of a heuristic can “incorporate a systemic error 
prejudicing a particular group”). 
 180.  Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 161, at 159, 181 (explaining that erroneous 
decisions early in the herding model potentially remain uncorrected because the agreement 
discourages appeal); Talley, supra note 162, at 101 (“[O]nce a precedential cascade begins, 
the resulting legal rule may––with high probability––vary from the efficient legal rule, even 
though each judge was assumed to be efficiency-minded and rational.”). 
 181.  Jois, supra note 147, at 128. 
 182.  Robert P. George, Kelsen and Aquinas on “The Natural-Law Doctrine,” 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1625, 1637 (2000) (“Some laws . . . are derived from the natural law by a 
process akin to the deduction of demonstrable conclusions from general premises in the 
sciences.  Other positive laws, however, cannot be derived from the natural law in so direct 
and straightforward a fashion.  Where law is required to resolve a coordination problem, it is 
often the case that a variety of possible solutions, all having certain incommensurable 
advantages and disadvantages, are rationally available as options.  One solution, however, 
must be authoritatively chosen by the legislator if the problem is to be solved.”); see Note, 
Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455, 481 (1957) [hereinafter Note, 
Natural Law] (“The natural law obligation to respect the lives of others, and the common 
good demand that some determination be authoritatively made; they do not prescribe or 
indicate any one choice.  That choice may be arbitrary or dependent upon a host of 
psychological, sociological or economic considerations and data.  Laws of this type draw 
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distinction.183  Examples of natural laws, which are arguably capable of 
being “wrong,” include homicide,184 rape, theft, and other “grave injustices 
which are straightforwardly contrary to natural law.”185  Much of 
constitutional law arguably falls in this camp.186  Examples of positive 
laws, which do not embody intrinsic values and instead merely coordinate 
behavior, are property rules that create reliance interests,187 traffic laws 
requiring that individuals drive on a certain side of the street,188 and a rule 
 
their immediate force from the positive law and only depend indirectly upon the natural law, 
in that it is natural law which gives force to any positive law and may require that a problem 
be solved in some way, the most reasonable way for that time and place.  There seems to be 
no feeling that positive law is in any way a derogation from natural law, but rather that it is a 
necessary fulfillment and complement.”).  
 183.  Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of 
Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U. 
PA. L. REV. 371, 413 (1992) (“Whatever their differences, positivists address the problem of 
identifying law by emphasizing the importance of distinguishing ‘law as it is’ from ‘law as 
it ought to be.’  Their basic intuition is that the process of identifying the law is separate 
conceptually from the process of projecting aspirations for what the law might become and 
the goals it might serve.  The first process uses formal criteria to identify the events of law 
creation.  The second process uses moral reasoning, prudential reasoning, and other kinds of 
normative argument to consider ways in which the law might change in the future.”); e.g., 
Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1614-15 (2000) (“To summarize, briefly and a bit crudely, 
natural law theory considers the connections between the universe, human nature, and 
morality, usually deriving the last from some combination of the first two . . . . Legal 
positivism is the belief that it is both tenable and valuable to offer a purely conceptual 
and/or purely descriptive theory of law, in which the analysis of law is kept strictly separate 
from its evaluation.”). 
 184.  Note, Natural Law, supra note 182, at 481 (“The law proscribing homicide, for 
example, is simply a detailed enactment of a natural law precept, taking into account a 
variety of fact situations which might arise, and incorporating in itself, to an extent, the 
natural law.”). 
 185.  George, supra note 182, at 1637-38 (“Some laws, such as those prohibiting murder, 
rape, theft, and other grave injustices which are straightforwardly contrary to natural law, 
are derived from the natural law by a process akin to the deduction of demonstrable 
conclusions from general premises in the sciences.”). 
 186.  Jois, supra note 147, at 77 (juxtaposing the reliance interests in property law 
against the importance of reaching the “right” answer to questions of constitutional law).  
But see Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 69 (1988) (“Positivism explains much that otherwise 
seems mysterious about the Court’s treatment of the fourth amendment.  The notorious 
circularity of the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, for example, comes as no surprise 
to a positivist.  What is reasonable for people to expect depends upon how our society 
actually functions, and a positivist is comfortable with the assertion that the Constitution is 
embodied in these expectations.”). 
 187.  Jois, supra note 147, at 77. 
 188.  George, supra note 182, at 1637-38 (“Consider, for example, the regulation of 
highway traffic.  From the basic principle of natural law which identifies human health and 
safety as goods to be preserved, together with the empirical fact that unregulated driving, 
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about whether a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affords shareholders 
a private right of action.189 
Finally, even if legal circularity risks entrenching an intrinsically 
“wrong” rule, entrenchment allows the pressure to build against the wrong 
rule, with the potential for that pressure to be vented by the adoption of a 
dramatically different rule at a time of “critical juncture.”190  Indeed, 
Professor Bailey H. Kuklin has recognized the potential for course 
correction in the context of the legal circularity of the Fourth Amendment 
“reasonable expectations of privacy” rule: 
 
Where the law is static, because the legal rule in a mature legal 
system is clear-cut, well-established, well-known and entrenched, 
the law on the books is enough to determine reasonable 
expectations.  The reasonable person expects the existing rule to 
endure and determine prospective issues, and need not consider 
anything other than the law on the books.  But where the law in a 
just legal system is under the stress of significant discontent, the 
expectations that are aroused, despite the known law on the 
books, pressure reform.  The influences on the expectations are 
the broad factors of change:  those events and states of affairs 
referred to in the definition which take place outside the law 
proper, or the law narrowly conceived.  When these forces reach 
a certain level, the system often vents the pressure for legal 
change by modifying the rule accordingly.191 
 
 
even among motorists of impeccable goodwill, places these human goods in jeopardy, it 
follows that a scheme of regulation (coordination) is necessary for the common good.  Yet, 
typically, various reasonable but incompatible schemes are possible.  For the sake of the 
common good, then, the relevant lawmaking authority must stipulate that one from among 
the various possible schemes shall be given the force of law.”); Note, Natural Law, supra 
note 182, at 481 (“On the other hand, a traffic law requiring that individuals drive on the 
right side of the street or stop at red lights is an arbitrary choice of one from among a 
number of morally indifferent possibilities.”). 
 189.  Jois, supra note 147, at 128 (“For example, if we are not concerned about the 
substantive content of the law, then it does not matter whether there is an implied private 
right of action under section 304 or not.  So long as a rule is established, and relatively 
unlikely to change over time, then the law is at least stable and corporations and 
shareholders can act accordingly.  For example, instead of repeatedly litigating the section 
304 question, shareholders might focus on other causes of action and thus save resources.”). 
 190.  Hathaway, supra note 148, at 642 (“Each critical juncture, in other words, produces 
a distinct legacy that remains largely intact until the next critical juncture breaks down and 
reshapes the political and institutional arrangements anew.”). 
 191.  Kuklin, supra note 125, at 34-35. 
COUTURE_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  8:40 PM 
498 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
Therefore, initial entrenchment of a wrong rule might create the 
environment for a correction to a “right” rule, perhaps even more quickly 
than in an environment without legal circularity. 
Whether the potential for “venting” of this pressure allays the concern 
about legal circularity’s entrenchment of an intrinsically wrong rule 
depends on whether there exist other actors (such as legislatures or 
regulators) empowered to correct course.  For this reason, in the context of 
stare decisis, Professor Oona A. Hathaway has argued that adherence to 
precedent should depend on how often “punctuations” occur: 
 
A strong rule of stare decisis in the constitutional law area would 
lock courts, and therefore the country, into continued adherence 
to a precedent that may be clearly inappropriate . . . .  By contrast, 
in the statutory context, courts consistently subject decisions to a 
much stronger standard of stare decisis because legislatures can 
provide a check on court decisions.192 
 
Similarly, when analyzing whether to adopt the potential legal circularity of 
a doctrine that risks entrenchment of an intrinsically “wrong” rule, courts 
and scholars should assess whether sufficient checks are in place to correct 
course when needed. 
In sum, therefore, when analyzing this factor in the Framework to 
Assess Legal Circularity, courts and scholars should recognize the potential 
that path dependency will entrench an early, possibly under-informed rule 
and consider whether the legal doctrine at issue embodies intrinsic 
principles or merely solves a coordination problem.  If the former, this 
factor weighs against adopting legal circularity, but this weight is 
somewhat offset if there are actors empowered to correct course when 
pressure builds against an intrinsically wrong rule.  If the latter, this factor 
is irrelevant to whether the doctrine’s potential legal circularity should be 
embraced. 
2. Effects of Greater Predictability 
The second factor in the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity is to 
analyze the pros and cons of the greater predictability afforded by 
embracing a legal doctrine’s potential for circularity. 
Legal circularity causes the law to be more uniform and thus more 
predictable.193  Under legal circularity, earlier courts’ rulings on an issue 
 
 192.  Hathaway, supra note 148, at 655-57. 
 193.  See Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 53 (“[C]onstitutional circularity seems likely 
to increase stability and reliance by making constitutional law more consistent with what the 
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affect later courts’ analyses of the same issue, making it more likely that 
later courts will agree with earlier courts.  The more courts that agree, the 
more likely that the rule will remain unchanged.  In this way, legal 
circularity mimics heuristics194 and herding195 and operates as a sort of 
super-charged stare decisis.196 
The predictability of a legal doctrine has myriad effects—some 
positive and some negative—on actors operating under the legal regime, 
litigants, regulators, the public, and courts.  The impacts of predictability 
depend on the doctrine at issue, and thus this factor will weigh in favor of 
legal circularity in some circumstances and against legal circularity in 
others. 
First, greater predictability allows actors operating under a legal 
regime to plan accordingly, with confidence about how their behavior will 
be treated.  On the positive side, to the extent that actors are planning 
value-enhancing transactions, greater stability is a benefit because it 
reduces transaction costs.197  This benefit is more likely if the legal regime 
involves commercial law, for example, as opposed to constitutional law.198  
A major caveat to this benefit, however, is that it only accrues if the 
relevant actors are able to act rationally in response to this predictability, 
rather than acting under the sway of various cognitive biases.199  On the 
 
people think it already is.”). 
 194.  Sale, supra note 152, at 954 (discussing how heuristics are self-reinforcing). 
 195.  Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 161, at 180 (“[H]erding increases the 
likelihood of agreement and decreases the likelihood of conflict among the appeals 
courts.”). 
 196.  E.g., Jois, supra note 147, at 77 (explaining that “[stare decisis] prompts stability in 
the law, since judges cannot make arbitrary decisions”). 
 197.  Nelson, supra note 147, at 63 (recognizing that a weaker form of stare decisis 
could increase uncertainty and “generate more systemic costs”); id. at 63 (“For instance, 
increased uncertainty may produce inefficient allocations of resources:  People might devote 
too little attention to certain types of long-range planning . . . .”). 
 198.  See Schauer, supra note 86, at 761-62 (“When the domain of decisionmaking is 
constitutional law, however, it is commonly supposed that these ‘rule of law’ values are of 
lesser importance.  And insofar as constitutional law is less transactional than much of 
commercial and contract law, involving fewer instances in which consistency qua 
consistency outweighs the substantive value or disvalue of the actual decision, then it is 
likely that these ruleness values will be less applicable.  There is no reason to suppose that 
just because under-and over-inclusive rules are desirable in some decisionmaking domains 
they are desirable in all decision-making domains.”). 
 199.  E.g., Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 7-9 (identifying 
and citing authority regarding a number of cognitive biases, “including the hindsight bias, 
the (flawed) reliance on heuristics (including the availability heuristic), the presence of 
overconfidence and overoptimism, the endowment effect (and other framing related biases), 
and the confirmation bias”); Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 549-62 (exploring the 
impacts of hindsight bias, the representiveness heuristic, risk tolerance, overconfidence, 
experiential thinking, source blindness, the framing effect, information overload, and social 
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negative side, greater predictability for actors potentially allows actors to fit 
their harmful conduct into loopholes, thus undercutting the purposes of the 
legal regime.200  Moreover, as more actors are able to fit their harmful 
conduct into safe harbors, this can have a messaging effect that the legal 
regime is unimportant, undercutting respect for the regime itself.201 
Second, greater predictability will likely lead to lower litigation costs.  
If the law on an issue is settled, parties are less likely to spend resources 
litigating it.202  Moreover, defendants will be less likely to enter into 
coercive settlements when legal doctrines are applied with greater 
consistency.203  If a legal doctrine has the potential to be the subject of 
frequent or high-value litigation, this benefit weighs in favor of adopting 
legal circularity. 
Third, greater stability decreases the discretion of regulators, with both 
positive and negative impacts.  On the positive side, less discretion 
decreases the likelihood of discriminatory enforcement.204  On the negative 
side, less discretion prevents regulators from responding nimbly to 
innovative attempts to evade the law.205  These dual potential impacts must 
 
investing affect investors); Langevoort, Taming, supra note 88, at 144-47 (discussing the 
biases of loss aversion, cognitive conservatism, representativeness, and investor 
overconfidence). 
 200.  E.g., Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 138 (“To the extent heuristics are 
based on erroneous assumptions about firm and market behavior, they potentially create safe 
harbors for bad behavior . . . .  It nevertheless seems troubling that heuristics likely create 
safe harbors for fraud.”); see also Sale, supra note 152, at 907 (“Further, depending on the 
nature and explicitness of the heuristic, it can create a safe harbor for fraud . . . .”). 
 201.  Sale, supra note 152, at 957-58 (“By applying the heuristics and using language 
and arguments that can appear as, at best, dismissive and, at worst, disdainful of the 
plaintiffs and their lawyers, the courts may send a message about their view of these cases 
. . . .  The result is a message that counteracts the one intended by the law.  Those stories 
then may influence the way people think about and internalize the law.  People obey laws 
out of an internalized respect for them.  Here people might reasonably conclude that the risk 
of being caught is low and that the community does not value the purposes of the securities 
laws.”). 
 202.  Nelson, supra note 147, at 63 (“For instance, increased uncertainty may produce 
inefficient allocations of resources: . . . they might spend too much money relitigating issues 
that the judiciary has already decided.”). 
 203.  E.g., Park, supra note 42, at 530-31 (“Courts have fewer options for early dismissal 
without a clear materiality standard to apply.  As a result, the pressure on companies to 
settle securities fraud cases regardless of their merit will increase under a qualitative 
standard.”). 
 204.  E.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture & B. Clifford Gerwick, The Evolutionary Biology of 
Fungi and Fraud, 5 J. MARSHALL L.J. 71, 88-89 (2011) (“Moreover, the vagueness 
necessitated by broad fraud statutes, even if within Constitutional constraints, imposes 
societal costs . . . . This delegation to prosecutors also enables discriminatory 
enforcement.”). 
 205.  E.g., id. at 78-79 (“A federal fraud statute’s susceptibility to resistance depends on 
whether it is drafted specifically or broadly, with the former being far more susceptible to 
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be weighed when assessing whether to embrace the potential circularity of 
a legal doctrine. 
Fourth, greater uniformity among courts has the potential to enhance 
the legitimacy of the courts, preventing the public perception that the law 
depends on the whim of the judge who is deciding the issue.206  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has advanced a similar rationale for adherence to stare 
decisis:  “There is . . . a point beyond which frequent overruling would 
overtax the country’s belief in the Court’s good faith.”207  This potential 
benefit is undercut, however, if the law becomes so rote that courts appear 
to be merely filling in blanks, rather than engaging in thoughtful 
adjudication.  Professor Sale identified a similar risk in the usage of 
heuristics: 
 
Ultimately, the opinions may also undermine the public’s faith in 
the judges and judicial system they represent.  One of the 
strengths of our legal system is its sensitivity to the particulars of 
legal disputes . . . .  Instead, the simplistic, fill-in-the blank nature 
of, for example, the Percentage Heuristic, at best reduces the law 
to a system of bright-line rules that may be easy to apply, but that 
is “rigid, inflexible, or unworkable”. . . .  Indeed, if the goal is to 
fashion reasoning to contribute to the legitimacy of the legal 
system, these heuristics may indicate that the courts are failing us.  
The continued proliferation of the heuristics also has the potential 
to cut the “heart” out of the “common law system . . . the written 
 
resistance.  As articulated by one commentator, ‘[f]raud is by its very nature bounded only 
by the versatility of the human imagination.’  As a consequence, . . . Chief Justice Burger 
noted that the ‘ever-inventive American ‘con artist’’ can often evade the scope of a specific 
fraud statute by changing just one component of his or her fraudulent scheme.”). 
 206.  Nelson, supra note 147, at 69 (quoting Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death 
of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 467, 484) (“If members of the 
Supreme Court were to overrule their predecessors’ decisions too often, however, the public 
would begin to reject this understanding of what judges do.  In Earl Maltz’s words, people 
would conclude that instead of ‘speaking for the Constitution itself,’ the Court’s decisions 
simply reflect the changing preferences of ‘five or more lawyers in black robes.’  This loss 
of faith in the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions would jeopardize the Court’s ability to 
function effectively.”). 
 207.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 
(1992) (“Despite the variety of reasons that may inform and justify a decision to overrule, 
we cannot forget that such a decision is usually perceived (and perceived correctly) as, at the 
least, a statement that a prior decision was wrong.  There is a limit to the amount of error 
that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts.  If that limit should be exceeded, disturbance 
of prior rulings would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had 
given way to drives for particular results in the short term.  The legitimacy of the Court 
would fade with the frequency of its vacillation.”). 
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judicial opinion.”  Respect for judges arises, in part, out of the 
opinions that they write.208 
 
Therefore, when analyzing whether to adopt the potential legal circularity 
of a doctrine, courts and scholars should weigh these opposing impacts. 
Finally, greater predictability leads to easier decision-making by 
courts, with associated efficiencies.209  This has potential negative impacts 
as well, however.  For one, this ease can start to operate more like a 
shortcut, preventing doctrinal innovations and stunting the evolution of the 
law.210  In addition, when faced with multiple potential grounds on which to 
rule, courts will likely be drawn to the easiest, thus leaving sticky, unsettled 
questions unresolved.211  Finally, once a doctrine is viewed as well-settled, 
there is a risk of incremental expansion.212 
In sum, therefore, when analyzing this factor in the Framework to 
Assess Legal Circularity, courts and scholars should identify and weigh the 
 
 208.  Sale, supra note 152, at 960-62. 
 209.  See Hathaway, supra note 148, at 626 (discussing how stare decisis furthers 
judicial efficiency) (“By relying on past decisions, judges can save significant time and 
effort and thereby consider far more cases than would otherwise be possible.”). 
 210.  Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 56 (“[I]f deviation from the status quo is viewed 
as change, then constitutional circularity may prevent some changes by ruling out doctrinal 
innovations based on other interpretive methods that would be at odds with public 
perceptions of the Constitution.”); id. at 64 (“That this circularity seems to freeze the law of 
jurisdiction is particularly odd in light of the dramatic revolution in such law symbolized by 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.”); Sale, supra note 148, at 955-56 (“The use of 
precedent is self-reinforcing in several ways.  First, it cabins the decision-makers’ approach 
to the problem from the beginning, making it more difficult for them to consider different 
approaches to the problems.  Second, it affects the way that lawyers present their cases, such 
that they seek out and invoke precedent, again reinforcing the power of the precedent being 
used.”); id. at 951-52 (“However, because the heuristics function as shortcuts that eliminate 
cases and preempt the opportunity for the creation of substantive securities law, they 
actually have the potential to stunt the development of the common law beyond the pleading 
stage.”). 
 211.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 137 (“If correct in positing that judges and 
clerks are focused on heuristics based in materiality and scienter concepts, there will be a 
skew in the development of doctrine.  The materiality and scienter doctrines will be highly 
developed, with an extensive body of precedent covering a variety of factual situations.  In 
contrast, doctrines relating to more complex questions, such as affirmative duties to 
disclose, will remain underdeveloped.  In turn, un-certainty as to the scope of disclosure 
duties will persist.”). 
 212.  Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated, supra note 43, at 311 (“The first cases were 
highly fact-specific and not terribly controversial.  Even a ‘wannabe’ can get it right in 
deciding that defendants should not be held liable for not disclosing some particular risk 
factor if, elsewhere in the same document, they did indeed caution that reader about that 
very kind of risk, which is how the bespeaks caution doctrine began.  So, too, with puffery 
. . . .  But, gradually, judges become far more aggressive in the way they draw inferences ‘as 
a matter of law’ that terminate plaintiffs’ cases as in Eisenstadt.”).  
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impacts of greater predictability on actors operating under the legal regime, 
litigants, regulators, the public, and courts. 
3. Import of Reconceiving the Courts’ Role 
The third factor in the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity is the 
import of reconceiving the courts’ role under legal circularity. 
Traditionally, the debate about the role of the court within the rule of 
law has focused on whether, in addition to being a rule-applier, the court 
should be a rule-maker.213  At the extremes, this debate has involved 
rhetoric that pits “activist judges [who] regularly overturn the will of the 
people” against “mere automatons.”214  Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. 
famously (and controversially)215 invoked this debate in his confirmation 
 
 213.  Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 319 
(1997) (“Opponents of judicial activism, then, adopt the traditional assumption that 
adjudicative lawmaking is essentially nondemocratic.  I think this assumption is wrong, at 
least much of the time, and it is my intention in this Article to demonstrate how it is wrong.  
My thesis is simply that under certain, paradigmatic conditions, adjudication produces law 
through a process of representation that is akin, in crucial ways, to the process at work in 
parliamentary legislation.  This adjudicative process––what I will call adjudication as 
representation––imbues adjudicative lawmaking with the same kind (although perhaps not 
the same degree) of ‘democratic’ legitimacy that parliamentary lawmaking possesses; it 
renders adjudicative lawmaking legitimate in a way that is independent of the needs to fill 
legislative gaps and to check majoritarian excesses.”); Schauer, supra note 86, at 750 
(“What is the purpose of constitutional decisionmaking, as seen by the constitutional 
decisionmaker?  In asking these questions, I want to focus on the role of rules in this 
process.  What role do rules play in the self-understanding of the judicial role?  Do or should 
judges see themselves as the makers of rules to be applied by others?  Or instead as the 
appliers of rules made by others?  Or as resolvers of disputes whose goal is to reach the best 
result for the case at hand?”); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. 
L. REV. 781, 790 (1989) (“There is one traditional element of the Rule of Law in its 
substantive guise that is not explored by Rawls, yet it looms large in American 
jurisprudence.  This element is the commitment to the separation of powers, and the 
connected ideas about judicial review and the constrained role of the judge.  This 
commitment also figures in the instrumental conception from the instrumental point of view:  
rules as applied must not differ from the rules as made (Fuller’s precept of ‘congruence’).  
Otherwise, the system gives conflicting commands and fails in its purpose of guiding 
behavior of the addressees.  In a system committed to the institutions of courts and judicial 
review as ways to apply law, this instrumental point takes the form of insisting that judges 
be constrained so that they strictly ‘apply,’ and do not ‘make,’ the law.  In the substantive 
conception of the Rule of Law the constrained judicial role is more central because it is held 
to be required for democracy, a core substantive value.”). 
 214.  Richard Lavoie, Activist or Automaton:  The Institutional Need to Reach a Middle 
Ground in American Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 611, 611-12 (2005) (criticizing this 
rhetoric). 
 215.  Morawetz, supra note 183, at 393-94 (“The difficulties that any theory has in 
coming to terms with the relationship of participant and theorist reflect the complex, Janus-
like role of judges as appliers of rules and interpreters/creators of rules.  If judging is like a 
COUTURE_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  8:40 PM 
504 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
hearings by likening a judge’s role to an umpire’s role in calling balls and 
strikes.216  Under both conceptions of the judge, as rule-maker and as rule-
applier, the judge is independent, acting as a neutral third party. 
Under legal circularity, however, the court has a third potential role:  
an active player affecting the conduct of actors under the rules.217  When a 
court rules on a legally circular doctrine, the court’s ruling directly affects 
the behavior of future parties.  For example, under the circularity of 
materiality, a court’s ruling that a certain type of statement is immaterial as 
a matter of law affects whether future reasonable investors will rely on 
similar statements or suffer the legal consequences.  Adding this 
conception of a court’s role to Chief Justice Roberts’ baseball analogy, the 
court applying legal circularity would have a role in addition to that of 
umpire (or even of baseball commissioner):  the court would heckle the 
pitcher, thus forcing the pitcher to adjust his or her behavior accordingly.  
Professor Neil S. Siegel recognized a similar active role for judges in the 
area of constitutional law: 
 
A better view of judicial role begins with the understanding that 
Justices succeed over the long run when their judgments express 
fundamental social values . . . .  That could occur because the 
Court ultimately proves effective in shaping popular 
commitments when the culture is divided, or because the Court is 
shaped by them.  Typically, the lines of causation run in both 
directions.  Those cultural values infuse the grand phrases of the 
Constitution with their contemporary meaning and help to imbue 
the Court’s work with legitimacy.  The umpire analogy, no matter 
how charitably it may be construed, erases the reality that the 
Court legitimates itself in history in significant part by 
functioning as an engaged participant in the constitutional culture 
 
game, what role––that of rule-maker, umpire, or player––is performed by the judge?  In true 
games, the distinction between participant and non-participant follows immediately from the 
rules.  Theoretical discourse about the rules themselves, rather than about moves that apply 
the rules, is the activity of outsiders and not of participants.  The fact that judges, who are 
obviously participants, engage in discourse about the rules and in applying the rules 
complicates the distinction between participant and theorist and underscores how 
problematic the metaphor of games is in this context.”); id. at 455 (“But the game metaphor 
cannibalizes itself, in part because the rules themselves are the subject of decision-
making.”). 
 216.  Chris Cillizza, John Roberts, Umpire, WASH. POST, (June 28, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/john-roberts-
umpire/2012/06/28/gJQAx5ZM9V_blog.html. 
 217.  See Morawetz, supra note 183, at 394 (“If judging is like a game, what role—that 
of rule-maker, umpire, or player—is performed by the judge?”). 
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of the nation, a culture in which competing visions of social order 
compete for popular allegiance.218 
 
This engaged participation by the court via legal circularity is a dramatic 
reconceived notion of the rule of law. 
Whether this reconceived notion of a court’s role is appropriate 
depends on whether the potentially circular legal doctrine would benefit 
from an additional active participant and, if so, whether the court is the 
appropriate party to play that role.  In a less heavily regulated area that 
might benefit from additional active participants, like constitutional law, 
this role might be appropriate.219  In a more heavily regulated area, 
however, this role might be unnecessary or even an inappropriate 
encroachment on the active roles of other players.  Key to this analysis is 
whether the court is better situated than the other players, like Congress or 
a regulatory agency, to fill this role, examining factors including the degree 
of expertise and the potential for bias.220 
4. Summary of the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity 
In sum, therefore, once a potentially legally circular doctrine has been 
identified via the Legal Circularity Test, the next step is to assess whether 
that potential circularity should be embraced or rejected.  Courts and 
scholars should use the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity to make 
that assessment. 
In particular, courts and scholars should weigh three factors, as 
applied to the legal doctrine at issue.  First, they should weigh the risk of a 
“wrong” rule.  This risk is present if the legal doctrine at issue embodies 
intrinsic principles, but this risk is somewhat offset if other players are 
empowered to correct course.  If the legal doctrine merely solves a 
coordination problem, however, this risk is probably not implicated.  
 
 218.  Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat:  On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 701, 712 (2007). 
 219.  Id. at 707-08 (“Roberts was presumably relying on the fact that a hit ball is either 
foul or fair, and that the baseball rule defining the strike zone seems relatively clear . . . .  It 
turns out that Roberts was wrong about much of baseball (and about sports more generally), 
but that is not my main concern here.  Rather, my primary concern is that Supreme Court 
Justices cannot even agree on the basic contours of the ‘strike zone’ when it comes to such 
fundamental matters as whether the equal protection clause presumptively prohibits racial 
classifications or instead targets practices of racial subordination.  That is because the 
constitutional text itself is indeterminate and the potential source materials for gleaning its 
meaning in particular settings are both numerous and contested.”). 
 220.  See Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 8 (“The Supreme Court, of course, could 
abuse, and arguably has abused, the approach by claiming to find in public perception of the 
Constitution whatever provision the Justices wish the Framers had crafted.”). 
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Second, they should consider the effects of greater predictability on actors 
operating under the legal regime, litigants, regulators, the public, and 
courts.  These effects can be both positive and negative, depending on the 
legal doctrine at issue, and thus this factor’s result will vary.  Finally, they 
should consider the import of reconceiving the court’s role as an active 
participant that affects the behavior of future litigants.  This active role may 
be more appropriate in a less heavily regulated area and less so in a more 
heavily regulated area, especially if the other players have greater expertise 
and a lower potential for bias. 
A comprehensive look at this framework reveals two interactions 
among factors that merit further discussion.  First, the presence of other 
actors in the area who pose less risk of bias and who possess greater 
expertise has the potential to cut in both directions when the legal doctrine 
at issue embodies intrinsic values as opposed to solving a coordination 
problem.  Under the first factor, if legal circularity poses the risk of 
entrenchment of an intrinsically “wrong” legal rule, this factor weighs 
against adoption of legal circularity; however, this factor is somewhat 
neutralized if other actors exist who are empowered to correct course.221  
Under the third factor, on the other hand, if others with less risk of bias and 
with more expertise are actively regulating an area, this factor weighs 
against courts’ taking a more active role via legal circularity.222  The 
application of the framework in this scenario is nuanced, depending on 
whether the other players are active or inactive.  Under the first factor, the 
focus is on whether other players exist who are empowered to correct 
course if needed, not on whether other players are active in the area.  Under 
the third factor, the focus is on whether others are actually actively 
regulating in the area.  Therefore, if other players exist but are inactive, the 
first factor’s weight against legal circularity is somewhat neutralized, and 
the third factor favors adoption of legal circularity.  If other players with 
less risk of bias and with more expertise are actually actively regulating in 
the area, the first factor’s weight against legal circularity continues to be 
somewhat neutralized, but the third factor weighs heavily against legal 
circularity. 
Second, a legal doctrine’s role as a coordination mechanism impacts 
the analysis of both the first and second factors.  Under the first factor, if a 
legal doctrine merely coordinates behavior rather than embodying intrinsic 
values, there is no risk of “wrong” rule, and this factor is neutral with 
 
 221.  See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the risk of a legal doctrine’s potential for 
circularity resulting in the entrenchment of the “wrong” rule). 
 222.  See supra Part III.B.3 (arguing that when a court makes a ruling, it has the potential 
to affect the future behavior of other actors). 
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respect to the adoption of legal circularity.223  Under the second factor, if a 
legal doctrine coordinates behavior, actors operating under the legal regime 
will benefit from the enhanced predictability afforded by legal circularity, 
potentially engaging in beneficial transactions, thus weighing in favor of 
the adoption of legal circularity.224  Therefore, this framework suggests that 
the adoption of legal circularity may be more appropriate when a legal 
doctrine serves to coordinate behavior. 
This framework is admittedly complex, and the outcome will depend 
on the unique attributes of each potentially circular legal doctrine.  Similar 
debates about stare decisis often frame the issue as a binary choice between 
“truth” and “stability.”225  Regardless of whether this framing is helpful in 
the context of stare decisis, it is an over-simplification of the various 
competing considerations underlying the adoption of legal circularity.  
Moreover, as explained in the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity, 
there is not necessarily a tension between “truth” and “stability,” especially 
when the legal doctrine merely solves a coordination problem.  In order to 
exemplify how the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity should be 
applied, this Article will now assess the potential legal circularity of 
materiality under this framework. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS LEGAL 
CIRCULARITY TO MATERIALITY 
This section applies the above-proposed Framework to Assess Legal 
Circularity to the doctrine of materiality, for purposes both of exemplifying 
how this framework should be applied and of assessing whether the 
potential legal circularity of materiality should be embraced.  This section 
concludes that the risk of a “wrong” materiality rule is slight because the 
materiality doctrine primarily operates as a coordination mechanism and 
because there are actors empowered to correct intrinsically wrong rules; 
that the potential positive effects of greater predictability outweigh the 
potential negative effects if legal circularity is coupled with increased 
investor education; and that, absent forthcoming materiality guidance from 
the SEC, courts should embrace this reconceived active role with respect to 
the materiality doctrine. 
 
 223.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 224.  See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing how legal circularity increases predictability). 
 225.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare 
decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”); Jois, supra note 147, at 127 
(posing the question:  “Truth or Stability?”); id. at 77 (“Stare decisis prevents the disruption 
that would occur if judges were constantly seeking the ‘correct’ rule.”). 
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A. Risk of a “Wrong” Materiality Rule 
The first factor in the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity is the 
risk that embracing a legal doctrine’s potential for circularity will lead to 
the entrenchment of a “wrong” rule because legal circularity is path 
dependent, affording a first mover advantage.  If the first mover adopts the 
“wrong” rule, that rule becomes entrenched via the operation of legal 
circularity.  Fundamental to this analysis is whether the legal doctrine at 
issue is meant to embody intrinsic values, akin to a natural law, or whether 
the doctrine is an arbitrary choice meant to solve a coordination problem, 
akin to a positive law.  Under the former scenario, this factor weighs 
against embracing a doctrine’s potential legal circularity, offset somewhat 
if there are actors empowered to correct course when needed.  Under the 
latter scenario, this factor is neutral.226 
Materiality contains both natural and positive law components, 
complicating the analysis of this factor.  Materiality, in essence, shields a 
speaker from liability for lies, as long as those lies are deemed 
unimportant.227  From this perspective, materiality does not seem to derive 
from any intrinsic values; if anything, it seems contrary to those values.  As 
discussed above, however, materiality also serves a different role:  it 
ensures disclosure of comprehensive and accurate information.228  From 
this perspective, materiality embodies some intrinsic values and a 
materiality standard that is off-base might undercut those values by 
disrupting the disclosure of comprehensive, accurate information. 
To the extent an intrinsically wrong rule were entrenched, however, 
there are actors––namely, Congress and the SEC––empowered to correct 
course.  Indeed, Congress has been extraordinarily active in regulating 
other components of securities fraud.  For example, in 1995, Congress 
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which creates a 
statutory safe harbor from liability for certain forward-looking statements, 
thus incentivizing issuers to make these disclosures.229  Therefore, although 
the legal circularity of materiality risks entrenching an intrinsically 
 
 226.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 227.  Padfield, Immaterial Lies, supra note 40, at 147 (“[W]hen a court grounds 
dismissal on a finding of immateriality, it is effectively saying that there is no basis for 
liability even if it were proven that an executive misstated the facts with intent to deceive 
(i.e., there was a lie).”). 
 228.  See supra Part II.A.  
 229.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1), 78u-5(c)(1). See generally Couture, Mixed Statements, 
supra note 31, at 257 (explaining that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act creates a 
safe harbor that protects companies and individuals, under certain circumstances, from 
liability under the securities acts for making misleading statements that qualify as “forward-
looking.”). 
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“wrong” rule, this concern is somewhat allayed by the possibility of 
checks. 
Materiality also serves a coordination function by drawing the line 
between what a speaker must disclose to investors and may keep private, 
between what a speaker must verify before saying and what he or she may 
say without concern about recourse, and between what an insider must 
disclose before trading and what the insider may keep private while 
trading.  If speakers and investors are both aware of this line,230 they can 
coordinate their behavior accordingly, engaging in securities transactions. 
Indeed, the materiality line could be drawn any number of places and 
still accomplish this coordination function, perhaps even more effectively.  
Accordingly, various scholars have argued that the materiality standard for 
securities fraud should be adjusted.231  For example, Professor Margaret V. 
Sachs has argued that the “reasonable investor” standard should be 
replaced with a “least sophisticated investor” standard232 when the plaintiff 
is an “underclass investor.”233  Professor Peter H. Huang has contended that 
determinations of materiality “should depend not just on the cognitive form 
and content of information, but also upon the affective form or presentation 
and emotional content of that information.”234  Professor James J. Park has 
argued that, when assessing a company’s liability for financial 
misstatements, the materiality standard should be quantitative rather than 
qualitative, with only quantitatively large misstatements deemed 
actionable.235  John M. Newman, Jr., Mark Herrmann, and Geoffrey J. Ritts 
have urged that, in fraud-on-the-market cases, materiality should be 
assessed from the perspective of a professional investor.236  Moreover, in 
 
 230.  Admittedly, whether investors are aware of this line and whether they can act 
rationally in response to it is not a given, in light of investors’ cognitive biases.  This issue is 
discussed below in Part IV.B. 
 231.  Of note, if these scholars’ proposed alternative definitions of materiality were 
adopted, the materiality doctrine would no longer satisfy the Legal Circularity Test, 
rendering this question moot. 
 232.  Sachs, supra note 42, at 481. 
 233.  Id. at 476 (defining “underclass investors” as “unsophisticated investors trading in 
inefficient markets without an adviser”). 
 234.  Huang, supra note 31, at 112; id. at 128 (“This Article also recommends expanding 
the so-called ‘total mix’ of information analysis by considering the ‘total affect’ of 
information.”). 
 235.  Park, supra note 42, at 519. 
 236.  John M. Newman, Jr., Mark Herrmann & Geoffrey J. Ritts, Basic Truths:  The 
Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory for Evaluating the “Misleading” and 
“Materiality” Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571, 584 (1995) (“If a 
professional investor would not care about the topic of the statement, or if the investor’s 
judgment of the stock’s proper price would not be changed by it, then the stock price could 
not have been affected by the misstatement.  The fact that a non-professional investor might 
have found the misstatement to be important is irrelevant to the price of the security.”). 
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other areas of the law, including common law fraud,237 mail and wire 
fraud,238 and perhaps even criminal securities fraud,239 the materiality 
standard is subjective rather than objective.  This authority suggests that the 
materiality line could be drawn in any number of places, so long as it is 
drawn somewhere. 
Therefore, although materiality includes both natural and positive law 
components, its primary function is one of coordination.  To the extent that 
materiality encompasses intrinsic values, Congress and the SEC are 
empowered to correct course.  Therefore, this factor is neutral with respect 
to whether courts and scholars should embrace the potential legal 
circularity of materiality. 
B. Effects of Greater Predictability about Materiality 
The second factor in the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity is to 
analyze the pros and cons of the greater predictability afforded by 
embracing a legal doctrine’s potential for circularity.  The predictability of 
a legal doctrine has myriad effects—some positive and some negative—on 
actors operating under the legal regime, litigants, regulators, the public, and 
courts.  On balance, these effects arguably support embracing the potential 
legal circularity of materiality if it is coupled with enhanced investor 
education and if courts apply it explicitly. 
1. Effects on Actors Operating Under the Legal Regime 
Looking at the impact on actors operating under the legal regime, 
greater predictability of materiality would affect the behavior of issuers and 
their insiders by lifting barriers to value-enhancing transactions, lowering 
compliance costs, and preventing management distraction.  In the context 
of issuer statements, a more predictable materiality standard would prevent 
issuers from engaging in excessive checking and double-checking of minor 
 
 237.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) (defining materiality as follows:  
“(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of the 
representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard 
the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man 
would not so regard it”). 
 238.  Couture, Gray Area, supra note 2, at 6-8 (explaining that materiality under the mail 
and wire fraud statutes is a subjective standard). 
 239.  See Couture, Criminal Securities Fraud, supra note 34, at 78-84 (analyzing the 
materiality standard under 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and concluding that would probably be 
interpreted as subjective, consistent with the materiality standard under mail and wire 
fraud). 
COUTURE_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  8:40 PM 
2015]     MATERIALITY AND A THEORY OF LEGAL CIRCULARITY 511 
 
information240 and would prevent them from needlessly restating 
unimportant information.241  In the context of issuer disclosures, a more 
predictable materiality standard would allow issuers to assess with greater 
certainty whether a particular piece of information must be disclosed to 
investors.242  In the context of transactions in issuers’ securities, greater 
clarity on the materiality standard would enable issuers to determine (1) 
whether any nonpublic information would have to be disclosed before 
engaging in the transaction; and (2) if so, whether that disclosure is feasible 
or whether to forego the transaction.243  Professor Heminway has explained 
how an unclear materiality standard, and the concomitant fear of second-
guessing, operate to inhibit value-enhancing transactions: 
 
When a corporate issuer desires to proceed with a transaction in 
the issuer’s securities, the issuer’s board of directors must 
identify the nonpublic facts in the issuer’s possession, determine 
the materiality or immateriality of those facts, and consider the 
potential effects (positive or negative) of the possible public 
disclosure of those facts that are material.  Based on this process 
of identification and consideration, the issuer can determine 
whether the desired securities trading transaction requires 
disclosure of any facts then in its possession, and, if so, whether it 
is willing or able to disclose those facts and proceed with the 
 
 240.  Sauer, supra note 12, at 319 (“This continuing uncertainty has increased the cost of 
generating and verifying financial information and has added to the amount of litigation 
burdening the corporate world.”). 
 241.  Park, supra note 42, at 517 (limiting his discussion of materiality to financial 
misstatements) (citing authority) (“Legal commentators have almost uniformly argued that 
the standard is vague and impossible to implement.  Some practitioners have asserted that 
the standard has increased compliance costs, leading to a significant rise in unnecessary 
restatements by public companies.”). 
 242.  Padfield, Is Puffery Material?, supra note 74, at 345 (“Both corporate managers 
and retail investors would be on notice that various types of material information must be 
disclosed, however they would be unclear whether a particular disclosure’s materiality 
should be assessed vis-à-vis the average retail investor or the sophisticated institutional 
investor.  This would likely lead to increased costs because both corporations and investors 
must factor in this uncertainty when deciding what information to disclose and how to 
weigh the information that is disclosed.”). 
 243.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1171 (“Yet, the ambiguities 
encountered by transaction planners in interpreting and applying the existing legal standard 
for materiality frequently discourage, rather than encourage, public disclosure of important 
issuer and transaction information.  An issuer or insider may forego securities trading (and 
the attendant public disclosure obligation) rather than trade and assume the risk of a lawsuit 
that second-guesses, ex post, the issuer’s or insider’s ex ante materiality analysis.”). 
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transaction.  The concept of materiality is undeniably significant 
in the issuer’s analysis.244 
 
Examples of potentially inhibited value-enhancing transactions 
include “open market stock repurchase programs, self-tender offers to retire 
all or part of an outstanding class or series of economically 
disadvantageous securities, and private and public offerings at favorable 
prices.”245  In each of these contexts––issuer statements, issuer disclosures, 
and issuer transactions in securities––uncertainty about the materiality 
standard distracts management and increases the costs of internal 
compliance and of outside counsel.246 
On the flip side, however, greater predictability would arguably enable 
issuers and their insiders to make misrepresentations and to engage in 
insider trading without fear, as long as they were to operate within the safe 
harbor provided by a clearer materiality standard.247  For example, in the 
context of affirmative misstatements, Professor Hoffman has argued that 
greater predictability, including that afforded by the materiality doctrines of 
puffery and bespeaks caution, enables disclosing entities to “shelter 
questionable information from fraud claims by making it part of optimistic 
predictions or pairing it with cautions.”248  Professor Park has likewise 
recognized that a quantitative materiality standard for financial statements 
would allow for earnings manipulation:  “Aggressive companies could 
tweak their earnings at will to meet market expectations.  As long as a 
financial misstatement was below the five percent quantitative threshold, 
the company would not be in violation of the securities law.”249  Likewise, 
 
 244.  Id. at 1156. 
 245.  Id. at 1175-76. 
 246.  Id. at 1177-82 (arguing that additional clarity regarding the materiality assessment 
will prevent management distraction and lower the cost of outside counsel); Sauer, supra 
note 12, at 355 (“This development has contributed to an age of anxiety in the corporate 
boardroom and executive suite.  To address the increased risks attending materiality 
judgments, companies have incurred substantial costs for internal monitoring and 
professional services.”). 
 247.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1191 (“Of course, where 
definitions important to a rule of law are clarified, unintended loopholes are likely to be 
identified and exploited by those who desire to push that rule of law to its logical−or 
illogical−extreme.”). 
 248.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 588 (“Notably, both doctrines create 
incentives for corporations to use words that they hope will induce reliance, but which may 
be rendered legally irrelevant; they are bright-line rules that enable fraud.”). 
 249.  Park, supra note 42, at 516; id. at 526 (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt) 
(citing Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Remarks at the NYU Center for 
Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt) (“[S]ome companies misuse 
the concept of materiality.  They intentionally record errors within a defined percentage 
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in the context of insider trading, greater clarity with respect to materiality 
would afford issuers and their insiders “a clear roadmap to trade for 
personal gain without liability.”250  All together, enabling issuers and their 
insiders to operate within these loopholes would potentially send “the 
message to executives that it is often okay to embellish the truth”251 and 
reduce investors’ faith in the markets.  This behavior within the zone of 
materiality would be less harmful, however, if the other actors in the 
marketplace––namely, investors––operated under a similarly predictable 
regime, thus enabling them to anticipate and discount any such behavior by 
issuers, and it is to the effect on investors that this Article now turns. 
Greater predictability about materiality would arguably lower 
investors’ costs, clarifying for them what information to expect, what 
information to discount or disregard, and what information to value.  
Professor Padfield has noted that uncertainty about the materiality standard 
could lead to increased costs for investors because they must “factor in this 
uncertainty when deciding . . . how to weigh the information that is 
disclosed.”252  In addition, to the extent that a clearer materiality standard 
would enable an issuer to engage in beneficial transactions, to lower 
compliance and counsel costs, and to avoid management distraction, those 
value enhancements would inure to the benefit of the issuer’s investors.253 
Whether investors would be able to realize fully this benefit depends, 
however, on their ability to learn the court-made materiality standard and to 
act thereon.  Both of these conditions are potentially problematic.  First, as 
discussed above,254 the current materiality standard already imposes a 
heavy “legal duty to be a rational shareholder”255 by requiring investors to 
know “all publicly available information” relevant to the investment256 and 
 
ceiling.  They then try to excuse that fib by arguing that the effect on the bottom line is too 
small to matter.  If that’s the case, why do they work so hard to create these errors?  Maybe 
because the effect can matter, especially if it picks up the last penny of the consensus 
estimate.  When either management or the outside auditors are questioned about these clear 
violations of GAAP, they answer sheepishly . . . . ‘It doesn’t matter.  It’s immaterial.’”). 
 250.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1154. 
 251.  Padfield, Immaterial Lies, supra note 40, at 147. 
 252.  Padfield, Is Puffery Material?, supra note 74, at 345. 
 253.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1141 (“Inherent ambiguities in 
the interpretation and application of the existing materiality standard not only are 
nonessential to the achievement of applicable policy goals, but also create certain 
undeniable negative impacts on stockholder value that may undercut those policy goals.  
These impacts include, among other things, foregone value-enhancing transactions 
(including issuer offerings and stock repurchases), management distractions, and outside 
counsel fees and disbursements.  Negative impacts on stockholder value might be reduced 
or eliminated if materiality were more precisely defined.”). 
 254.  See supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 255.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 595. 
 256.  Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 306. 
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to grasp, among other concepts, the time-value of money,257 the taxation of 
different investments,258 basic accounting treatment,259 diversification and 
risk,260 the nature of margin accounts,261 and the security industry’s 
investment structure.262  Indeed, Professor Langevoort has characterized the 
current depiction of “investors carefully perusing the details of regulation-
mandated disclosure documents” as the “SEC’s myth-story.”263  Adding the 
requirement that investors be abreast of the case law about materiality 
would enhance this burden, potentially further widening the gap between 
investors’ actual behavior264 and that of the mythical reasonable investor. 
Second, even if investors were abreast of the current case law 
interpretation of materiality, they might not be able to act accordingly, in 
light of their cognitive biases.  Indeed, a burgeoning area of scholarship 
about behavioral economics has identified so-called “moody investing”265 
as a significant problem even under the current materiality standard, which 
does not embrace legal circularity.266  Professor Barbara Black has 
summarized this scholarship as follows: 
 
 
 257.  Black, supra note 98, at 1494-95; Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 
301; Sachs, supra note 42, at 475-76. 
 258.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 582. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Black, supra note 98, at 1494-95; Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 
301. 
 261.  Black, supra note 98, at 1494-95. 
 262.  Id.; Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 301. 
 263.  Langevoort, Taming, supra note 88, at 187. 
 264.  Padfield, Is Puffery Material?, supra note 74, at 341 (“What the survey results 
show is that while the judges in the four surveyed cases concluded that no reasonable 
investor could find the statements challenged therein to be material because they constituted 
non-actionable puffery, between 33% and 84% of reasonable investors surveyed deemed the 
statements material.”); Sachs, supra note 42, at 476-77 (“To be sure, underclass investors 
are sometimes deceived by fraud that would fool the reasonable investor.  But they can also 
succumb to misrepresentations that the reasonable investor would dismiss as absurd.  The 
risk of their doing so has always existed, but it has recently increased exponentially due to 
the pervasiveness of Internet fraud, telemarketing fraud, and the ready availability of 
‘mooch lists’ of the unsophisticated, elderly, or otherwise vulnerable.”). 
 265.  Huang, supra note 31, at 102-03 (“[M]oody investing refers to investing that is (at 
least, partially) non-cognitive.”). 
 266.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 549 (“Given that investors in the 
aggregate at least sometimes behave foolishly, materiality—which asks what a reasonable 
investor will do—may result in a divergence between ‘what is commonplace or normal’ and 
what the law requires of investors.  That is, even if markets efficiently price assets over the 
long term, a materiality analysis which ignores the insights of BLE [Behavioral Law and 
Economics] threatens to disproportionately penalize individual investors, who (unlike 
institutions) are ‘hopelessly disastrous decision-makers.’”). 
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The research from behavioral economics on cognitive failings has 
much to offer in rethinking the artificial construct of a 
“reasonable investor” and its resulting lack of protection for 
investors, particularly unsophisticated retail investors.  Despite 
their cognitive failings and their lack of training for the task, 
investors are forced to invest in the market to save for their 
retirement and for other expensive undertakings, such as their 
children’s college education.  Behavioral economics thus 
supports the need for (at least some) paternalistic responses to 
cognitive biases.  Disclosure is not the panacea that drafters of 
federal securities laws may have thought it to be.267 
 
These cognitive biases include the hindsight bias, reliance on the 
representativeness heuristic, overconfidence, the endowment effect, the 
confirmation bias, risk tolerance, experiential thinking, source blindness, 
herd behavior, the framing effect, information overload, social investing, 
loss aversion, and cognitive conservatism.268  As such, contrary to the 
materiality doctrines of puffery, bespeaks caution, and triviality, investors 
are arguably already prone to rely on hyperbolic statements,269 forward-
looking statements accompanied by cautionary language,270 and trivial 
information.271  As Professor Jayne W. Barnard has documented, older 
 
 267.  Black, supra note 98, at 1507-08. 
 268.  Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 7-9; Hoffman, The 
“Duty,” supra note 81, at 549-62; Langevoort, Taming, supra note 88, at 144-47. 
 269.  Hoffman, The Best Puffery, supra note 32, at 1435 (“Marketing scholars have 
demonstrated that puffing statements are believed on their own terms and lead some 
individuals to further imply facts about the puffed speech that are untrue.”); Huang, supra 
note 31, at 115 (“Moody investing means that the puffery defense is flawed because vague, 
promotional, or hyperbolic statements can have real impacts on moods and therefore should 
not be deemed immaterial as a matter of law.”). 
 270.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 587-88 (“Liberal use of the bespeaks-
caution technique also contradicts BLE insights . . . . Not only do individuals have the 
problems of risk processing, endowment, experiential thinking, and information overload, 
they are also unable to make the subtle adjustment with respect to informational source, as 
courts applying the bespeaks-caution doctrine require them to do.”); Huang, supra note 31, 
at 125 (“Moody investing means that the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine is problematic because 
meaningful cautionary language concerns the probability of the optimistic forward-looking 
statements being realized.  But, if those optimistic statements have induced positive moods 
or emotional reactions, such feelings are insensitive to probability variations.  Because these 
positive feelings display probability insensitivity, merely disclosing the low probability of 
success or the high probability of losses will not have much of an impact on those who 
experience such feelings.  Thus, even cautionary language that is cognitively meaningful 
may be neither affectively nor effectively meaningful.”). 
 271.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 588-89 (“The triviality doctrine also 
contrasts with evidence from BLE.  It boils down to an intuition that ‘trivial bits of 
information do not play a role in the investment decisions of reasonable investors because 
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investors, because of “neurobiological, psychosocial, and environmental 
factors,”272 may be especially prone to relying on “misrepresentations or 
promises that are so implausible that most reasonable investors ‘would 
dismiss [them] as absurd.’”273 
One possible solution, which would enable issuers, their insiders, and 
investors to reap the benefits of greater predictability afforded by the legal 
circularity of materiality while lessening the information-gathering burden 
on investors and counteracting the impacts of investors’ cognitive biases, is 
enhanced investor education.  Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham has 
urged that investor education should include “exposition of the main biases 
associated with investing.”274  This Article argues that, especially if courts 
and scholars adopt the legal circularity of materiality, investor education 
should also address the concept of materiality, the legal implications of 
materiality, and the case law interpreting certain representations as 
immaterial as a matter of law.  Because families and schools lack the time 
and expertise to educate about financial fraud, and because financial firms 
have conflicting interests that may inhibit effective antifraud education, 
regulators such as the SEC, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”), and state securities bureaus are best suited to provide this 
antifraud education.275  Indeed, these regulators are already engaging in 
antifraud education, but this education currently focuses on specific types 
of fraud (such as affinity fraud, Ponzi schemes, and pump-and-dump 
 
they relate to a small aspect of the business.’  But, as BLE [Behavioral Law and Economics] 
teaches, investors are poor at making this type of comparison.”). 
 272.  Jayne W. Barnard, Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education, 17 ELDER L.J. 
201, 237 (2010). 
 273.  Id. at 207 (“Still, many smart and well-educated older investors fall for these 
investment schemes.”). 
 274.  Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 792 (2002) (“[T]he key cognitive biases that investor-education 
programs should address boil down to three basic categories:  (1) reference-point-related 
issues (including conservatism, excessive loss aversion, and frame dependence), (2) 
probabilistic analysis issues (including representativeness and overconfidence), and (3) 
mental errors (the brain functioning outside of one’s awareness––namely, anchoring, regret, 
and addiction).  In each category, the lessons would consist of identifying and describing the 
set of biases and introducing steps that can reduce their adverse effects.”). 
 275.  James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now:  The Importance, Nature, Provision 
and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 154 (1998) (“The 
government in one or more forms, through agencies and self-regulatory organizations, as 
well as in partnership with consumer groups, should therefore be the primary educator about 
financial abuse and fraud, including fraud and deception in firm investor education 
materials.”); id. at 158 (“While the SEC’s educational efforts have been useful, it could 
greatly improve them if it redirected its activities, in accordance with the Article’s guidance, 
to concentrate on anti-fraud education and to do more to promote and facilitate the 
educational services of financial and nonprofit firms.”). 
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schemes)276 and “red flags” of fraud (such as promises of “guaranteed” 
returns, the scarcity tactic, and the promise to share the “secrets” of the 
experts),277 without discussing the concept of materiality. 
Investor education about materiality is not a perfect solution, however.  
First, investor education diverts resources from other uses,278 imposing 
opportunity costs.279  These regulatory costs would be ongoing because 
new investors are constantly entering the market.280  In addition, investor 
education is not a magic bullet.  To the extent that investors are operating 
under cognitive biases, education might be ineffective because many of 
those cognitive biases are unconscious.281  Even more troubling, some 
investors might respond to this education through the lens of the “false 
confidence” bias and thus, by learning more about securities fraud, 
overestimate the scope of its protection.282 
 
 276.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Investor Information Bulletins, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs_subject.shtml#fraud; FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
Investor Alert:  Avoiding Investment Scams, available at https://www.finra.org/Investors/ 
ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/FraudsAndScams/P118010; N. AM. SECS. ADMIN’RS. ASS’N, 
Top Investor Threats, available at http://www.nasaa.org/3752/top-investor-threats/. 
 277.  SEC, How to Avoid Fraud, at https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/avoidfraud.htm; 
FINRA, Fighting Fraud 101: Smart Tips for Investors, at http://www.bbb.org/smart-
investing/assets/fighting-fraud-101.pdf; NASAA, Red Flags of Fraud, at 
http://www.nasaa.org/investor-education/nasaa-fraud-center/red-flags-of-fraud-2/. 
 278.  Heminway, Female Investors, supra note 29, at 331 (“Moreover, investor 
education adds cost to the regulatory framework that should be assessed in relation to its 
perceived benefits and other possible responses.”). 
 279.  Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 267 
(2008) (“What sorts of alternative public policies could we pursue if we were to move 
beyond the search for financial literacy?  At least four possibilities are ripe for 
experimentation:  (1) substantively regulating financial products; (2) increasing the 
resources with which consumers approach the market; (3) framing financial choices so as to 
invoke good decisions; and (4) aligning incentives of sellers with needs of consumers.”). 
 280.  Huang, supra note 31, at 115 (“A response to such mood impacts is that over time, 
people may learn to ignore or discount puffery.  But, such a response ignores the fact that 
investors are not a fixed group, but instead consist of an ever-changing pool of investors, 
who as they become older and if wiser are replaced by a new cohort still wet behind the ears 
and ready to be misled emotionally.”). 
 281.  Hoffman, The “Duty,” supra note 81, at 598 (“Because irrationality is ‘sticky’ 
behavior, the normal consequences of creating legal duties––the modification of behavior––
may not arise through the operation of the materiality doctrine.  Even though the duty to be 
rational is increasingly specific and publicized, it would be very surprising if in the years 
post-TSC Industries, there was significantly less real-world price movement in reaction to 
disclosures that the law excludes as nonactionable.”); Huang, supra note 31, at 115-16 
(“Also problematic for such a response is the vast empirical and experimental research 
finding that people are systematically wrong in their forecasts of how they will feel.  In fact, 
people are unconscious of how they feel.”). 
 282.  Barnard, supra note 272, at 228 (“Ironically, the pervasiveness of fraud prevention 
advice and education may cause some older adults to feel safer from fraud than they really 
are.”); Hoffman, The Best Puffery, supra note 32, at 1431 (“[W]hen authorities work to 
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2. Effects on Litigants, Regulators, the Public, and the 
Courts 
Turning to the impact on litigants, greater predictability about the 
materiality standard would likely lead to lower litigation costs and more 
targeted, meritorious litigation.  The more settled the law on materiality, 
the more likely that unmeritorious suits will be dismissed pretrial.283  As a 
consequence, a clearer materiality standard would lessen the incentive for 
companies to settle unmeritorious claims out of fear that the potential 
damages, even if unlikely to be imposed by the trier of fact, would be 
catastrophic for the firm.284 This dynamic would enhance shareholder 
value.285  In addition, because private securities litigation is an essential 
 
increase protections from fraud, consumers feel a ‘false confidence,’ their defenses to 
puffery are reduced, and advertisers are encouraged to puff at greater rates.”); id. at 1430 
(2006) (summarizing this economic argument, although disagreeing with it) (citing Richard 
J. Parmentier, SIGNS IN SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SEMIOTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 144-45 (1994)) 
(“When regulation is introduced, economists assume that consumers will (mistakenly) 
believe that government-run anti-fraud regimes are perfectly enforced.”); Langevoort, 
Selling Hope, supra note 90, at 672 (“In general, we can expect that individual investors will 
usually underestimate the risk that they would be disadvantaged by the law.  The product of 
a successful sales interaction is the customer’s belief that she is acting prudently.”); Willis, 
supra note 279, at 272-73 (“Financial-literacy programs are not only premised on the idea 
that consumers can control their financial situation, but also promote this belief through 
their curricula to motivate participants.  In reality, this education may do no more than 
increase overoptimism and the illusion of being able to control financial risk.”). 
 283.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1183 (“[T]he current ill-
defined legal standard governing materiality determinations makes pretrial dismissal of an 
insider trading class action difficult, regardless of the overall merits of the action.  For 
similar reasons, a trial defense based on immateriality is risky at best.  These factors likely 
contribute to the large number and percentage of settlements in insider trading actions.  
These settlements decrease corporate resources available to stockholders (as residual 
claimants on the issuer’s assets), without resulting in a proportional sharing among 
stockholders of the settlement payment or other benefits.”); Park, supra note 42, at 530 
(limiting his discussion of materiality to financial misstatements) (“In addition to increasing 
potential liability, the qualitative materiality standard increases the probability that a 
securities fraud case will move beyond the motion to dismiss or summary judgment 
stage . . . .  As a result, the pressure on companies to settle securities fraud cases regardless 
of their merit will increase under a qualitative standard.”). 
 284.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1191 (“[B]y enhancing 
certainty and predictability of result, effective materiality guidance may result in fewer 
insider trading class action settlements, and the value of any settlements should better reflect 
actual, rather than speculative (or nuisance), measures of value.”); Sauer, supra note 12, at 
319 (“This continuing uncertainty has increased the cost of generating and verifying 
financial information and has added to the amount of litigation burdening the corporate 
world.”). 
 285.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1141 (“Moreover, it is 
probable that the existing legal standard for materiality enhances prospects for non-
meritorious or marginal, speculative, settlement-focused, expensive, time-consuming class 
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component of securities regulation, with plaintiffs operating as private 
attorneys general,286 greater certainty would encourage plaintiffs (and their 
attorneys) to invest resources in meritorious cases, with greater confidence 
that the investment will pay off, and would encourage defendants in those 
cases to settle without incurring substantial litigation costs.287 
The greater predictability afforded by embracing the legal circularity 
of materiality would have dual impacts on regulators.  First, akin to private 
litigants, regulators operating under greater certainty would be more 
willing to devote their limited resources to cases with merit.288  Second, this 
greater certainty would translate to less discretion for regulators.  Less 
discretion would lower the risk of biased enforcement.289  At the same time, 
however, less discretion would inhibit regulators’ ability to respond nimbly 
to new types of securities fraud.290  This negative impact would be lessened 
somewhat, however, by the fact that securities regulation does not operate 
in a vacuum.  In truly egregious cases, criminal mail and wire fraud, and 
perhaps even criminal securities fraud, would be able to fill in any gaps in 
the securities regulatory scheme.291 
 
action litigation against issuers and their insiders, further eroding stockholder value.”). 
 286.  Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.:  Reliance 
on Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 
330, 338 (2008) (“[E]mpirical studies make clear that the SEC cannot investigate and bring 
enforcement actions against all corporate wrongdoers; the concept of the private plaintiffs 
acting as a ‘private attorney general’ as a necessary supplement to the SEC’s enforcement 
powers maintains its vitality.”) (citations omitted). 
 287.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, 1169-70 (“In an environment 
with limited resources, a prospective plaintiff, enforcement agency, or prosecutor logically 
would be more likely to invest those limited resources on a clear-cut case than a case that 
promises complex and difficult issues of proof.  If public and private enforcement of the 
securities laws is to be an effective method of preventing and punishing fraud, manipulation, 
and deception as a means of assuring investors of the integrity of our securities markets, 
then U.S. securities regulation should allow for more straightforward identification and 
punishment of violators.”). 
 288.  Id. at 1141. 
 289.  Heminway, Just Do It!, supra note 30, at 1010-11 (“[T]he vagueness of aspects of 
the legal standard for insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 (including the materiality 
element), when paired with the broad enforcement discretion available in the insider trading 
enforcement process, invites the introduction of enforcement biases.”). 
 290.  Id. at 1011-12 (“The relationship between unclear regulation and enforcement 
discretion is advantageous to federal agencies charged with enforcing the law in the areas of 
regulatory mandate.  It allows enforcement agents to use enforcement as a regulatory tool.  
As a result, the desire for broad enforcement discretion is not unique to insider trading 
regulation or the SEC.  The obvious benefit of enforcement discretion in this context is that 
it affords enforcement agents the opportunity to mold their enforcement strategies and 
efforts to fit new, unforeseen factual contexts.”). 
 291.  Couture, Criminal Securities Fraud, supra note 34, at 78-84 (explaining that the 
materiality standard under 18 U.S.C. § 1348, a criminal securities fraud provision, would 
potentially allow prosecution for conduct that is not actionable under § 10(b)); Couture, 
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With greater uniformity among courts under a more predictable 
materiality standard, the public would have greater faith that courts are not 
acting on whim and would be encouraged to enter the capital markets.  
Taken to an extreme, however, this predictability could undercut the 
public’s respect for the courts if it appeared that judges were applying 
simple rules without any analysis.  Therefore, if courts were to adopt the 
circularity of materiality, they should explain the role that prior precedent 
plays in the materiality analysis rather than doing so in a conclusory 
fashion. 
Finally, as alluded to in the prior paragraph, greater predictability 
would ease the burden of courts’ decision-making, leading to greater 
judicial efficiency.  The benefits of greater efficiency would be offset 
somewhat, however, by the resultant skewing of courts’ decision-making.  
Courts would be less likely to explore the nuances of materiality, 
potentially stunting the continued evolution of this doctrine that is central 
to the securities regulatory scheme, resulting in bright-line rules that are 
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.292  As a consequence, under the 
legal circularity of materiality, the materiality determination would be less 
likely to take into account the various factors that might influence whether 
a particular statement is important to investors.  Professor Langevoort gave 
the following example of how the same statement, in different contexts, 
could have differing levels of importance: 
 
It is no doubt true that if the management of a small company, 
with no established reputation, simply made optimistic remarks to 
an investor or business audience, investors would be unlikely to 
rely.  That is indeed the setting in which many of these cases 
arise.  But suppose that a more established company was 
experiencing known difficulties, leading to substantial anxiety 
about the company’s prospects.  A statement that “we are 
optimistic that our performance this quarter will be in line with 
expectations”––though not unlike statements that some courts 
have dismissed as a matter of law as too general to be reliable––
probably would be viewed as meaningful by sophisticated 
investors.  A simple “we are optimistic,” on the other hand, 
 
Gray Area, supra note 2, at 3-8 (explaining that the materiality standard under the mail and 
wire fraud statutes is lower than the standard under the securities fraud statute, thus allowing 
prosecution for conduct that is not civilly actionable as securities fraud). 
 292.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (“Any approach that designates a 
single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such 
as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive and underinclusive.”); O’Hare, supra note 
54, at 1700 (“I encourage courts faced with vague statements of corporate optimisim to 
undertake a full materiality analysis rather than relying on a simple puffery review.”). 
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would probably convey little, and indeed confirm some adverse 
suspicions. In sum, context really is crucial.293 
 
Additionally, courts would be more likely to rule on the ground of 
materiality, thus resulting in the underdevelopment of important doctrines, 
such as the scope of disclosure duties.294  Finally, the circularity of 
materiality might operate to expand the scope of immateriality.  Materiality 
holdings operate somewhat as a one-way lever because courts choose 
between holding that a representation is immaterial as a matter of law and 
holding that a representation is potentially material.  Upon a holding of 
potential materiality, the question of materiality is left to the trier of fact.  
When cases are settled, this question is never reached.  As a result, under 
legal circularity, holdings of immateriality would have a greater impact 
than holdings of potential materiality, thus potentially leading to ever-
increasing zones of immateriality.295 
3. Assessment of the Varying Effects of Greater 
Predictability About Materiality 
In sum, therefore, applying this factor in the Framework to Assess 
Legal Circularity to materiality, there are positive and negative impacts of 
greater predictability.  On the positive side, greater predictability about 
materiality would arguably lift barriers to value-enhancing transactions by 
issuers, lower issuers’ compliance costs, prevent management distraction, 
provide greater clarity to investors about what information to expect and 
value, lower litigation costs, decrease the extortive effect of securities 
litigation on defendants, encourage litigants and regulators to devote their 
limited resources to meritorious litigation, decrease the potential for biased 
enforcement, increase the public’s faith in the courts and thus their 
 
 293.  Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 65, at 124. 
 294.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 74, at 137 (“If correct in positing that judges and 
clerks are focused on heuristics based in materiality and scienter concepts, there will be a 
skew in the development of doctrine.  The materiality and scienter doctrines will be highly 
developed, with an extensive body of precedent covering a variety of factual situations. In 
contrast, doctrines relating to more complex questions, such as affirmative duties to 
disclose, will remain underdeveloped.  In turn, un-certainty as to the scope of disclosure 
duties will persist.”). 
 295.  Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated, supra note 43, at 311 (“The first cases were 
highly fact-specific and not terribly controversial.  Even a ‘wannabe’ can get it right in 
deciding that defendants should not be held liable for not disclosing some particular risk 
factor if, elsewhere in the same document, they did indeed caution the reader about that very 
kind of risk, which is how the bespeaks caution doctrine began.  So, too, with puffery . . . .  
But gradually, judges become far more aggressive in the way they draw inferences ‘as a 
matter of law’ that terminate plaintiffs’ cases, as in Eisenstadt.”).  
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willingness to enter the markets, and enhance judicial efficiency.  On the 
negative side, greater predictability about materiality would potentially 
create safe harbors for misrepresentations and insider trading, widen the 
gap between the hypothetical reasonable investor standard and the behavior 
of actual investors, lessen regulators’ ability to respond nimbly to new 
types of securities fraud, suggest that courts are merely filling in the blanks, 
stunt the evolution of a nuanced materiality doctrine, skew courts’ 
decisions away from underdeveloped issues, and lead to expanding zones 
of immateriality.  Some of these potential negative impacts (such as 
providing issuers and insiders safe harbors within which to mislead 
investors and widening the gap between the materiality standard and the 
behavior of actual investors) could be offset by enhanced investor 
education, but, as discussed above, investor education is not a complete 
solution.  Other potential negative impacts (such as the public’s perception 
that courts are merely filling in blanks) could be allayed if courts were 
explicit in applying the legal circularity of materiality rather than doing so 
in a conclusory fashion.  On balance, this factor arguably supports 
embracing the legal circularity of materiality.  This conclusion is consistent 
with the recommendations of several other scholars, including Professors 
Heminway296 and Park,297 who have performed similar balancing tests and 
argued for the adoption of more predictable materiality standards. 
C. Import of Reconceiving the Courts’ Role in the Materiality 
Doctrine 
The third factor in the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity is the 
import of reconceiving the courts’ role under legal circularity as an active 
participant affecting the conduct of future actors.  Whether this 
reconception of the courts’ role is appropriate depends on whether the 
potentially circular legal doctrine would benefit from an additional active 
participant and, if so, whether courts are the appropriate party to play that 
role. 
Securities regulation is heavily regulated, with Congress and the SEC 
making rules, the SEC, the Department of Justice, and private litigants 
 
 296.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1135 (“This Article argues, 
based on applicable policy and related elements of stockholder value, that issuers, insiders, 
and their legal advisors, as well as investors and courts, would benefit from additional 
guidance in making materiality determinations in the insider trading context and suggests a 
method for constructing that guidance.”). 
 297.  Park, supra note 42, at 519 (arguing that within the context of financial 
misstatements only, companies should only be vicariously liable for quantitatively large 
misstatements, while individuals’ liability should continue to be assessed using a qualitative 
materiality standard). 
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enforcing those rules, and the courts interpreting and applying those rules.  
At first glance, this would not seem to be an appropriate arena for courts to 
play an enhanced role, unlike perhaps in the arena of constitutional law. 
Despite these various players, however, materiality remains murky 
and unsettled, and the benefits of greater predictability explained above 
remain unrealized.  In 1999, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 
in an effort to provide guidance on the materiality of financial statements, 
but this guidance, which rejects solely using quantitative benchmarks in 
favor of also considering qualitative considerations,298 has been heavily 
criticized as nebulous.299  Indeed, scholars have urged the SEC to adopt 
clearer materiality guidance.  For example, Professor Heminway has 
published a series of articles urging the adoption of materiality guidance for 
purposes of insider trading, titled, successively, “Materiality Guidance in 
the Context of Insider Trading:  A Call for Action”300 and “Just Do It!  
Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance in Insider Trading.”301  The 
SEC has not heeded these calls, however, which suggests that there is a 
potential need for courts to play a more active role in clarifying the 
materiality standard. 
The next question is whether courts, via the adoption of the legal 
circularity of materiality, are the appropriate party to accomplish this 
clarification.  Arguing in favor of courts as the appropriate party is that 
they are less likely to be biased302 and are less likely to be motivated by the 
desire to expand their authority.303  Arguing against courts (in favor of the 
SEC) is that the SEC has more expertise,304 is less likely to issue guidance 
 
 298.  SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150, 45151 (Aug. 12, 
1999). 
 299.  Park, supra note 42, at 517 (citing authority) (“Legal commentators have almost 
uniformly argued that the standard is vague and impossible to implement.”). 
 300.  Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 14, at 1135. 
 301.  Heminway, Just Do It!, supra note 30, at 1045. 
 302.  Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 42-43 (assessing 
whether various regulators should respond to correct market-based cognitive biases and 
proposing an intermediate presumption against such intervention by courts and a strong 
presumption against such regulation by the SEC); Heminway, Just Do It!, supra note 30, at 
1045 (acknowledging that the “federal courts are, as a general principle, the most impartial 
sources of rulemaking”). 
 303.  Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 46 (“[D]ecentralized 
judge-made law poses less danger to the market than does the SEC’s centralized decisions.  
Although the SEC regulators may seek to expand their regulatory authority and prestige, 
judges are unlikely to share this motivation.”). 
 304.  Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 48 (“Dispersed 
nonexpert judges may lack expertise in evaluating intervention; while perhaps better 
motivated and less prone toward overconfidence than the SEC, the lack of expertise still 
leaves judicial regulation of the securities market prone to error.”); Heminway, Just Do It!, 
supra note 30, at 1043-44 (arguing that the SEC has the most substantive competence to 
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without due care,305 is more likely to incorporate input from various 
stakeholders (especially if such guidance is issued as a legislative rule 
subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act rather than as an interpretive rule),306 and is more likely to 
assess materiality in a comprehensive fashion rather than merely drawing 
on personal investment experience.307  One traditional argument against 
relying on courts is that they are “ill equipped, as a general matter, to 
assemble the information and resources necessary to engage in 
comprehensive rulemaking in an area like materiality” because they are 
limited to deciding the case before them and are not formally coordinated 
except for stare decisis.308  This traditional argument would fall away if the 
legal circularity of materiality were embraced because a single court 
decision would have impacts beyond the litigants before the court, thereby 
enabling coordinated and comprehensive guidance by courts. 
In sum, this factor is mixed.  If the SEC continues to leave a 
materiality vacuum, it may be appropriate for courts to play an active role 
in developing the materiality doctrine by embracing its potential for legal 
circularity. 
 
issue materiality guidance). 
 305.  Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 31, at 48 (“Judges may prefer 
to dispose of cases quickly, particularly if securities law cases are a disfavored class due to 
their complexity or other reasons.”). 
 306.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published 
in the Federal Register . . . . Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this 
subsection does not apply––to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice.”); Heminway, Just Do It!, supra note 30, at 
1005 (“Accordingly, the status of the proposed materiality guidance as a legislative or 
interpretive rule under the APA is inconclusive.”). 
 307.  Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated, supra note 43, at 317 (“More powerfully, the 
judge is likely to intuit the answer to a materiality question by asking herself whether she 
would have put much stock in the publicity.  After all, she has made many investment 
decisions and has a sense about how reasonable people do these things.  Most successful 
people, however, overestimate their own prudence, caution, reasonableness, etc., especially 
in hindsight.”); Padfield, Is Puffery Material?, supra note 74, at 347-48 (“A second point is 
that the reasonable investor standard may have nothing to do with actual investors at all, but 
rather is based upon some ‘normative idealized type of behavior.’  If that is to be the 
standard, however, it is highly questionable whether courts should be the ones deciding 
upon the norms––particularly without any express acknowledgement thereof.”). 
 308.  Heminway, Just Do It!, supra note 30, at 1042 (“A court depends on having a case 
before it that allows it to rule on a particular matter; the manner of regulation of the 
judiciary is, therefore, by its nature, unpredictable and incremental rather than regular and 
comprehensive.  In addition, the judiciary is independent.  The activities of individual 
judges across the U.S. District Courts and the Circuit Courts of Appeal are not formally 
coordinated, except through stare decisis, when applicable.  It would be very difficult for the 
federal courts, in spite of their expertise in materiality standards in insider trading, to fashion 
comprehensive materiality guidance with alternating presumptions over a range of facts.”). 
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D. Summary of the Application of the Framework to Assess Legal 
Circularity to Materiality 
Application of the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity to the 
materiality doctrine leads to the conclusion that, if the SEC continues to 
decline to provide further guidance about materiality, courts should 
explicitly embrace the legal circularity of materiality.  Because the primary 
function of the materiality doctrine is coordination, there is little risk of 
harm from the entrenchment of a “wrong” rule.  Moreover, to the extent 
that an intrinsically wrong rule were entrenched via legal circularity, the 
coalescence created by legal circularity would allow the pressure to build, 
which would perhaps incentivize Congress or the SEC to correct course.  
Greater predictability would lead to numerous benefits and its potential 
harms could be at least partially offset by enhanced investor education.  In 
addition, as Professor Abramowicz advised in the context of constitutional 
circularity, adoption of legal circularity should be explicit:  “[C]andid 
acknowledgment of constitutional circularity might help discipline its 
application, and it might in any event be preferable than a world in which 
constitutional doctrine is separated from the Constitution altogether.”309  By 
the same token, if courts embrace the legal circularity of materiality, they 
should do so explicitly, after applying both the Legal Circularity Test and 
the Framework to Assess Legal Circularity. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, this Article seeks to fill two voids in the extant scholarship.  
First, although securities scholars have engaged in a deep discussion about 
the materiality test, no one has discussed its potential for legal circularity, 
instead focusing on whether it imposes too high or low of a burden and on 
whether it is too ambiguous.  This Article fills that gap and, moreover, 
argues that embracing the legal circularity of materiality would help to 
solve some of the problems identified by other scholars, albeit not 
perfectly.  Second, although scholars in other disciplines have recognized 
the potential legal circularity of other doctrines, no one has crafted a 
comprehensive means of analyzing legal circularity across disciplines.  
This Article fills that hole by proposing a two-step Theory of Legal 
Circularity.  The first step is a Legal Circularity Test, which should help 
courts and scholars identify other legal doctrines that are potentially legally 
circular.  The second step is a Framework to Assess Legal Circularity, 
which should help guide courts and scholars in other disciplines in 
 
 309.  Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 8. 
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determining whether to embrace a particular doctrine’s potential to be 
legally circular. 
 
